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MESSRS. THURMAN, WASHBURNE &to-Q[if,/ 
CONSTITUTING AN 
ADVISORY COMMISSION . 
/ . ' :;.....--
ON 
DIFFERENTIAL RATES" BY RAIL RO ADS . ) . 
Between tho west and tho Seaboard. 
. . . . 
: : =· -: . . . . . . . : . : 
. . 
NEW YORK: 
RUSSi:LL BROTHERS, PRINTERS, 17, 19, 21, 28 ROSE STREET. 
l 8 8 2. 
2
IMPORT UPON DIFFERENTIAL RATES.
PEELIMINABY.
In January, 1882, the undersigned were notified that they
had been selected by the New York Central & Hudson Kiver
Eailroad Company, W. H. Vanderbilt, President ; the New
York, Lake Erie & Western Eailroad Company, H. J. Jewett,
President ; the Pennsylvania Eailroad Company, G. B.
Eoberts, President, and the Baltimore & Ohio Eailroad Com-
pany, John W. Garrett, President, to act as an Advisory Com-
mission upon " the differences in rates that should exist, both
eastwardly and westwardly, upon all classes of freights
between the several terminal Atlantic ports," and to report
upon the same.
Accepting the appointment, the undersigned met and organ-
ized as a Commission, at the City of New York, on February
13, 1882, by designating Mr. Thurman to act as Chairman and
selecting Mr. Thomas C. Moore, of Indianapolis, as Secretary.
On conferring with Mr. Albert Fink, who on that occasion rep-
resented the several railroads named, we were informed that
.., it was not the purpose or desire of the railroad managers to
>^ take part in the proposed inquiry after setting it on foot ; but
^. that they proposed to leave it exclusively in our hands, in the
expectation, however, that other parties interested in the
problems of railroad transportation would make before us a
full showing of the facts supposed to lave a bearing upon
the question, and that we would then express our opinion,
uninfluenced by the wishes or interests of the railroad com-
panies. The managers informed us, however, that they held
themselves ready to furnish any such information as might
be peculiarly within their knowledge, at any time when we
















































































































































llEPDRT UPON DIFFERENTIAL RATES. 
___ ...,...._ __ _ 
PRELIMINARY. 
In January, 1882, the undersigned were notified that they 
had been selected by the New.York Central & Hudson River 
Railroad Company, W. H. Vanderbilt, P1·esident; the New 
York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad Company, H. J. Jewett, 
President; the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, G. B. 
Roberts, President, and the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Com­
pany, John W. Garrett, President, to act as an Advisory Com­
mission upon " the differences in rates that should exist, both 
eastwardly and westwardly, upon all classes of freights 
between the several terminal Atlantic ports," and to report 
upon the same. 
Accepting the appointment, the undersigned met and organ­
ized as a Commission, at the City of New York, on February 
13, 1882, by designating Mr. Thurman to act as Chairman and 
selecting Mr. Thomas C. Moore, of Indianapolis, as Secretary. 
On conferring with Mr. Albert Fink, who on that occasion rep­
resented the several railroads named, we were informed that 
it was not the purpose or desire of the railroad manage1·s to 
take part in the proposed inquiry after setting it on foot; but 
that they proposed to leave it exclusively in our hands, in the 
expectation, however, that other parties interested in the 
problems of railroad transportation would make before us a 
full showing of the facts supposed to :have a bearing upon 
the question, and that we would then express our opinion, 
uninfluenced by the wishes or interests of the railroad com­
panies. The managers informed us, however, that they held 
themselves ready to furnish any such information as might 
be peculiarly within their knowledge, at any time when we 
might call for it. 
Having this understanding of our commission, and desir-
ous of acting intelligently and with full information, we
caused circulars to be sent to all the commercial organiza-
tions of the cities of New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and
Boston, and to such like organizations in the interior as it was
thought would be inclined to respond, inviting them to ap-
pear before the Commission and present their views ; and
whenever a desire to be heard was expressed by any one of
them, time and place were designated for the purpose.
From the Produce Exchange, the Board of Trade and
Transportation, and the Chamber of Commerce, of the City
of New York, and from the corresponding organizations of
the cities of Philadelphia and Baltimore, letters expressive
of a desire to be heard were received, and public meetings
were accordingly held in those cities, at which the question
referred to us was very fully considered and discussed. For
the purposes of such discussion, we found that in every in-
stance careful and thoughtful preparation had been made,
and the arguments, either in full or in substance, were put in
print for our subsequent review. Statistics were also col-
lected for us, so far as was thought important. Under the
guidance of the commercial bodies, we also visited and in-
spected the railroad terminal facilities, under circumstances
most favorable to a full understanding of the manner in which
they concerned the general subject.
The leading commercial organizations of St. Louis, Louis-
ville and Toledo also appeared before us at public sittings
held in those cities respectively, and presented their views in
print, supplementing them with oral arguments and explana-
tions.
We were also favored at Philadelphia with discussions by
representatives of the Board of Trade of Newark, New Jer-
sey, and at St. Louis with the views of the Board of Trade of
Indianapolis, presented by one of its members. The Cham-
ber of Commerce of Cincinnati communicated its views to us
in formal resolutions, without deeming it necessary to request
public sittings in that city, and single individuals, not repre-














































































































































Having this understanding of our commission, and desir­
ous of acting intelligently and with full information, we 
caused circulars to be sent to all the commercial organiza­
tions of the cities of New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and 
Boston, and to such like organizations in the interior as it was 
thought would be inclined to respond, inviting them to ap­
pear before the Commission and present their views ; and 
whenever a desire to be heard was expressed by any one of 
them, time and place were designated for the purpose. 
From the Produce Exchange, the Board of Trade and 
Transportation, and the Chamber of Commerce, of the City 
of New York, and from the corresponding organizations of 
the cities of Philadelphia and Baltimore, letters expressive 
of a desire to be heard were received, and public meetings 
were accordingly held in those cities, at which the question 
referred to us was very fully considered and discussed. For 
the purposes of such discussion, we found that in every in­
stance careful and thoughtful preparation had been made, 
and the arguments, either in. full or in substance, were put in 
print for our subsequent review. Statistics were also col­
lected for us, so far as was thought important. Under the 
guidance of the commercial bodies, we also visited and in­
spected the railroad terminal facilities, under circumstances 
most favorable to a full understanding of the maimer in which 
they concerned the general subject. 
The leading commercial organizations of St. Louis, Louis­
ville and Toledo also appeared before us at public sittings 
held in those cities respectively, and presented their views in 
print, supplementing them with oral arguments and explan a­
tions. 
We were also favored at Philadelphia with discussions by 
representatives of the Board of Trade of Newark, New J er­
sey, and at St. Louis with the views of the Board of Trade of 
Indianapolis, presented by one of its members. The Cham­
ber of Commerce of Cincinnati communicated its views to us 
in formal resolutions, without deeming it necessary to request 
public sittings in that city, and single individuals, not repre­
senting any formal organizations, have also in some cases 
been heard. We have also sought and obtained information
independently wherever we have found it available, and
have made use of the published reports of the railroad com-
panies for that purpose. Our endeavor has been to view the
subject from the standpoints of the various interests con-
cerned, and to reach a conclusion that OA'erlooked the just
claims of no interest and no locality.
THE QUESTION.
The subject referred to us is that commonly spoken of
under the designation of Differential Eates. In the reference,
however, and in the paper which follows, the term is made
use of in a somewhat restricted sense, being applied not to
the differences in rates generally, or as between the several
classes of freight as they are arranged in the tariffs of freight
charges, but to the differences in rates.which are made by
the railroad companies as between the several Atlantic sea-
port cities, and the interior points where the freights are taken
up or delivered. It appears that the four railroad companies
mentioned, and which, with the Grand Trunk of Canada, are
commonly called the Trunk Line roads, have generally been
accustomed to make higher charges for the transportation of
freights between New York and Boston, as eastern termini,
and the leading towns of the interior, than between Philadel-
phia and Baltimore and the like towns ; and that at the present
time they seem to agree in the policy and propriety of mak-
ing these differences. An idea of the extent of the differences
is indicated by the statement that, taking the charges for the
transportation of eastward bound freights from Chicago to
New York as the standard, the charges to Boston are made
the same, and those to Philadelphia two cents, and to Balti-
more three cents per hundred pounds less. On westward
bound freights the differences are not uniform, but are made
higher in the case of those classes of property which are
rated highest in the freight tariffs. As between the seaboard
cities and St. Louis, Cincinnati, Toledo and other Western
towns, the rates are proportioned to the Chicago rate accord-














































































































































been heard. We have also sought and obtained information 
independently wherever we have found it available, and 
have made use of the published reports of the railroad com­
panies for that purpose. Our endeavor has been to view the 
subject from the standpoints of the various interests con­
cerned, and to reach a conclusion that overlooked the just 
claims of no interest and no locality. 
THE QUESTION. 
The subject referred to us is that commonly spoken of 
under the designation of Differential Rates. In the reference, 
however, and in the paper which follows, the term is made 
use of in a somewhat restricted sense, being applied not to 
the differences in rates generally, or as between the several 
classes of freight as they are arranged in the tariffs of freight 
charges, but to the differences in rates.which are made by 
the railroad companies as between the several Atlantic sea­
port cities, and the interior points where the freights are taken 
up or delivered. It appears that the four railroad companies 
mentioned, and which, with the Grand Trunk of Canada, are 
commonly called the Trunk Line roads, have generally been 
accustomed to make higher charges for the transportation of 
freights between New York and Boston, as eastern termini, 
·and the leading towns of the interior, than between Philadel­
phia and Baltimore and the like towns ; and that at the present 
time they seem to agree in the policy and propriety of mak­
ing these differences. An idea of the extent of the differences 
is indicated by the statement that, taking the charges for the 
transportation of eastward bound freights from Chicago to 
New York as the standard, the charges to Boston are made 
the same, and those to Philadelphia two cents, and to Balti­
more three cents per hundred pounds less. On westward 
bound freights the differences are not uniform, but are made 
higher in the case of those classes of property which are 
rated highest in the freight tariffs. As between the seaboard 
cities and St. Louis, Cincinnati, Toledo and other Western 
towns, the rates are proportioned to the Chicago rate accord­
ing to mileage. This is the existing rule or practice. 
6
Whether it is right or proper to make any such discrimina-
tion in the charges for the transportation of property between
the Atlantic cities and the cities of the interior, and if so, to
what extent, is the question that we understand was referred
to us, and nothing more. We, therefore, limit our discussion
to that question, and pass by many subjects of interest in
railroad transportation that were more or less touched upon
in the public discussions which took place in our hearing, but
which can interest us only as private citizens. Whatever
opinions we or any of us may have respecting controverted
questions in railroad policy and railroad management, which
do not fall within the scope of our present inquiry, it would
not become us to intrude them into this discussion.
THE PARTIES CONCERNED.
Although the invitation to us came from the Trunk Line
railroad companies, we have not understood that this was be-
cause the subject was one over which they had rightfully any
exclusive authority. It is, indeed, a subject with which they,
first of all, are called upon to deal, for they and their affiliated
roads enforce the charges which come under consideration,
and establish the differentials if any are established at all.
But the railroads constitute a single class only of the many
whose interests may be affected, and it may appear, perhaps,"
that they are not the class most largely concerned. In all the
discussions before us it has been assumed that the people of
Boston, New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore, and especially
all those who are engaged in the exchange of commodities
with the interior and with foreign countries, are largely in-
terested, and that their prosperity is to some extent involved
in the relative adjustment of rates. The railroads of the in-
terior, which act as feeders to the Trunk Lines, and divide
with them the charges on freights moved between the in-
terior and the seaboard, are also interested to the extent that
the differentials affect their proportion of the charges. We
have found also that the people of the interior consider
their interests to some extent involved in the question; and














































































































































Whether it is right or proper to make any such discrimina­
tion in the charges for the transportation of property between 
the Atlantic cities and the cities of the interior, and if so, to 
what extent, is the question that we understand was referred 
to us, and nothing more. We, therefore, limit our discussion 
to that question, and pass by many subjects of interest in 
railroad transportation that were more or less touched upon 
in the public discussions which took place in our hearing, but 
which can interest us only as private citizens. Whatever 
opinions we or any of us may have respecting controverted 
questions in railroad policy and railroad management, which 
do not fall within the scope of our present inquiry, it would 
not become us to intrude them into this discussion. 
THE PARTIES CONCERNED. 
Although the invitation to us came from the Trunk Line 
railroad companies, we have not understood that this was be­
cause the subject was one over which they had rightfully any 
exclusive authority. It is, indeed, a subject with which they, 
fust of all, are called upon to deal, for they and their affiliated 
roads enforce the charges which come under consideration, 
and establish the differentials if any are established at all. 
But the railroads constitute a single class only of the many 
whose interests may be affected, and it may appear, perhaps,· 
that they are not the class most largely concerned. In all the 
discussions before us it has been assumed that the people of 
Boston, New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore, and especially 
all those who are engaged in the exchange of commodities 
with the interior and with foreign countries, are largely in­
terested, and that their prosperity is to some extent involved 
in the relative adjustment of rates. The railroads of the in­
terior, which act as feeders to the Trunk Lines, and divide· 
with them the charges on freights moved between the in­
terior and the seaboard, are also interested to the extent that 
the differentials affect their proportion of the charges. We 
have found also that the people of the interior consider 
their interests to some extent involved in the question ; and 
they certainly are concerned in having such tariffs of charges 
upon the roads over which their traffic is conducted as
will give them the advantages of any and all the Atlantic
markets, without subjecting their dealings with any one of
them to unfair conditions or burdens. It is therefore evident
that the question is one of very general interest; and it may
almost be said that the question of relative equality of rates,
as between Chicago and the Atlantic ports, when those be-
tween the other Western towns and the same ports are meas-
ured by them, is one of national rather than of local concern.
THE SITUATION.
Three distinct views of the differential rates were taken
and urged before us, which may be shortly stated as follows :
The New York view, that the differences made in the rates in
favor of Baltimore and Philadelphia were wholly wrong and
should be abrogated; the Baltimore view, that the differen-
tials were right in principle, but if anything too small; the
Philadelphia view, that the differentials should continue, but
that they ought not to discriminate as between Philadelphia
and Baltimore. In the interior we encountered much differ-
ence in opinion, but no views distinctively peculiar.
The discussion was opened at New York, where it seemed
to be assumed that the parties chiefly concerned were the
three cities of New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore, and
that the differentials operated to build up the business of the
two last to the prejudice of that of New York. On this as-
sumption it was then said they were unjust, and that it was
the duty of the New York railroads to force their abrogation.
It was also assumed that two of the Trunk Line railroads were
peculiarly New York roads, whose managers ought to be ex-
pected to labor especially in the New York interest, and to
enter into the rivalries of that city, so far, at least, as might
be necessary to protect the commerce of New York against in-
jury through the more favorable rates which might be offered
by the Philadelphia and Baltimore kroads to the people of
those cities respectively. At Philadelphia a somewhat simi-
lar view was taken of the obligation of the Pennsylvania Eail-














































































































































upon the roads over which their traffic is conducted as 
will give them the advantages of any and all the Atlantic 
markets, without subjecting their dealings with a.ny one of 
them to unfair conditions or burdens. It is therefore evident 
that the question is one of very general interest ; a.nd it may 
almost be said that the question of relative equality of rates, 
as between Chicago and the Atlantic ports, when those be­
tween the other W astern towns and the same ports are meas­
ured by them, is one of national rather than of local concern. 
THE SITUATION. 
Three distinct views of the differential rates were ta.ken 
and urged before us, which may be shortly stated as follows : 
The New York view, that the differences made in the rates in 
favor of Baltimore and Philadelphia were wholly wrong a.nd 
should be abrogated ; the Baltimore view, that the differen­
tials were right in principle, but if anything too small ; the 
Philadelphia view, that the differentials should continue, but 
that they ought not to discriminate as between Philadelphia 
and Baltimore. In the interior we encountered much differ­
ence in opinion, but no views distinctively peculiar. 
The discussion was opened at New York, where it seemed 
to be assumed that the parties chiefly concerned were the 
-three cities of New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore, a.nd 
that the differentials operated to build up the business of the 
two last to the prejudice of that of New York. On this as­
sumption it was then said they were unjust, and that it was 
the duty of the New York railroads to force their abrogation. 
It was also assumed that two of the Trunk Line railroads were 
peculiarly New York roads, whose managers ought to be ex­
pected to labor especially in the New York interest, and to 
enter into the rivalries of that city, so far, at least, as might 
be necessary to protect the commerce of New York against in­
jury through the more favorable rates which might be offered 
by the Philadelphia and Baltimore ,,roads to the people of 
those cities respectively. At Philadelphia a somewhat simi­
lar view was ta.ken of the obligation of the Pennsylvania Rail­
road to protect Philadelphia interests, and at Baltimore a 
8
corresponding protection appeared to be looked for at the
hands of the Baltimore & Ohio Eailroad. Thus the several
Trunk Line railroads were spoken of as New York, Philadel-
phia and Baltimore roads respectively, and claims of a local
nature were made upon them as being such roads.
Nothing, however, in our investigation of the subject has
struck us more forcibly than the fact that the growth of rail-
road business has been such as to take from the several
Trunk Line roads nearly all of purely local character which they
formerly possessed. The time appears to have gone by when
the interests of any one of them can be concentrated upon
and bound up indissolubly with the interests of any one city,
so as to constitute it either the dependent or the champion of
that city as against the rest of the Union, or even as against
any other commercial centre of the Union. The arms of
every one of these roads reach out in every direction to em-
brace and gather in the business of the country, and to dis-
tribute impartially according to need and demand. States
and cities have called particular railroads into being, but
they cannot circumscribe their operations, or make exclusive
appropriation of their benefits. Once constructed, they be-
long to a public which pays little regard in business matters
to State lines, and business reasons, which have general influ-
ence and force, control their operations, in spite of local sym-
pathies or desires. It is true that two of the Trunk Line
railroads—the New York Central & Hudson Eiver, and the
New York, Lake Erie & Western—hereinafter spoken of as the
Central and the Erie respectively—find the largest share of
what is called their through business directed to or origin-
ating at the City of New York, and it may be that their man-
agers desire to bring to that city all the business they can
control. In common parlance, there is certainly nothing
misleading in speaking of these two as New York roads; for
the major part of their interests centre in New York, and
whatever benefits or injures the business of New York, must,
to some extent, benefit or injure them also. But these roads
do not refuse freights to Baltimore, Philadelphia or Boston ;














































































































































corresponding protection appeared to be looked for at the 
hands of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. Thus the several 
Trunk Line railroads were spoken of as New York, Philadel­
phia and Baltimore roads respectively, and claims of a local 
· nature were made upon them as being such roads. 
Nothing, however, in our investigation of the subject has 
struck us more forcibly than the fact that the growth of rail­
road business has been such as to take from the several 
Trunk Line roads nearly all of purely local character which they 
formerly possessed. The time appears to have gone by when 
the interests of any one of them can be concentrated upon 
and bound up indissolubly with the interests of any one city, 
so as to constitute it either the dependent or the champion of 
that city as against the rest of the Union, or even as against 
any other commercial centre of the Union. The arms of 
every one of these roads reach out in every direction to em­
brace and gather in the business of the country, and to dis­
tribute impartially according to need and demand. States 
and cities have called particular railroads into being, but 
they cannot circumscribe their operations, or make exclusive 
appropriation of their benefits. Once constructed, they be­
long to a public which pays little regard in business matters 
to State lines, and business reasons, which have general infhi­
ence and force, control their operations, in spite of local sym­
pathies or desires. It is true that two of the Trunk Line 
railroads-the New York Central & Hudson River, and the 
New York, Lake Erie & Western-hereinafter spoken of as the 
Central and the Erie respectively-find the largest share of 
what is called their through business directed to or origin­
ating at the City of New York, and it may be that their man­
agers desire to bring to that city all the business they can 
control. In common parlance, there is certainly nothing 
misleading in speaking of these two as New York roads; fOl' 
the major part of their interests centre in New York, and 
whatever benefits or injures the business of New York, must, 
to some extent, benefit or injure them also. But these roads 
do not refuse freights to Baltimore, Philadelphia or Boston ; 
on the contrary, they enter into competition for them, and 
9
through. the assistance of affiliated roads, endeavor to make
it for the interest of the people of those cities to avail them-
selves of their facilities in the transportation of goods and
supplies. They thus make themselves part of a system of
competitive roads, which offers to the business community
of every Atlantic seaport a choice of traffic routes and traffic
agencies, and they solicit business on the necessary under-
standing that they shall respect the just rights and claims of
all localities, and not sacrifice to New York the interests
which are confided to them elsewhere.
It is also not misleading to speak of the Baltimore & Ohio
Eailroad as a Baltimore road, for its interests, in the main,
centre in the City of Baltimore ; its bonds and stocks are
supposed to be mainly held or controlled there, and its traffic
is mainly between that city and the interior. But this road,
no more than the New York roads, consents to stand apart
from the railroad system of the country, as a road limiting
its business to a single Atlantic terminus, and declining general
competition. On the contrary, it solicits business at the
seaports to the north of Baltimore; and that its efforts
in that direction have a fair measure of success is evi-
denced by the fact that in the year 1880 it carried of the
westward bound freight moved by the Trunk Line roads from
New York more than eight per cent., from Philadelphia more
than nine per cent., and from Boston about five per cent.,
and these proportions are fairly representative of the general
run of its traffic. These facts are sufficient to show that
neither the New York roads nor the Baltimore road are so ex-
clusively linked to the business interests of those cities re-
spectively as to be either unable or unwilling to share in or
contribute to the prosperity of rival cities. And it is now
publicly said and seems to be understood that the Baltimore
<fe Ohio is seeking to obtain an independent line into New
York, that it may make its competition at that point still
more active and efficient.
It certainly cannot be claimed, with much appearance of
plausibility, that the Pennsylvania Bailroad is the road of any














































































































































through the assistance of affiliated roads, endeavor to make 
it for the interest of the people of those cities to avail them­
selves of their facilities in the transportation of goods and 
supplies. They thus make themselves part of a system of 
competitive roads, which offers to the business community 
of every Atlantic seaport a choice of traffic routes and traffic 
agencies, and they solicit business on the necessary under­
standing that they shall respect the just rights and claims of 
all localities, and not sacrifice to New York the interests 
which are confided to them elsewhere. 
It is also not misleading to speak of the Baltimore & Ohio 
Railroad as a Baltimore road, for its interests, in the main, 
centre in the City of Baltimore ; its bonds and stocks are 
supposed to be mainly held or controlled there, and its traffic 
is mainly between that city and the interior. But this road, 
no more than the New York roads, consents to stand apart 
from the railroad system of the country, as a road limiting 
its business to a single Atlantic terminus, and declining general 
competition. On the contrary, it solicits business at the 
seaports to the north of Baltimore; and that its efforts 
in that direction have a fair measure of success is evi­
denced by the fact that in the year 1880 it carried of the 
westward bound freight moved by the Trunk Line roads from 
New York more than eight per cent., from Philadelphia more 
than nine per cent., and from Boston about five per cent., 
and these proportions are fairly representative of the general 
run of its traffic. These facts are sufficient to show that 
neither the New York roads nor the Baltimore road are so ex­
clusively linked to the business interests of those cities re­
spectively as to be either unable or unwilling to share in or 
contribute to the prosperity of rival cities. And it is now 
publicly said and seems to be understood that the Baltimore 
& Ohio is setking to obtain an independent line into New 
York, that it may make its competition at that point still 
more active and efficient. 
It certainly cannot be claimed, with much appearance of 
plausibility, that the Pennsylvania Railroad is the i·oad of any 
particular city. The company which owns it is indeed a Penn-
10
sylvania corporation, its offices are in the City of Philadelphia,
its stocks and bonds are largely held there, and perhaps not
largely held elsewhere in this country, and it is not improb-
able that the feelings and sympathies of those who manage
its concerns would incline them to desire specially the growth
and prosperity of Philadelphia above other places. But the
road has its eastern terminus, not at Philadelphia, but on the
harbor of New York, where it has made large and costly
preparations to compete with the 'Central and the Erie for
New York business. That it does compete with those roads
successfully is shown by the enormous amount of freight
which it moves from and carries into that city, and by the
fact that the merchants of New York have come to look upon
it, with entire justice, as one of their most important channels
of communication with the West. In the year 1880 this road
took out of New York twenty-six per cent. of the westbound
freight carried by the Trunk roads, and delivered to it nearly
twenty per cent. of the eastbound. While thus successfully
bidding for the custom and favor of New York, it is plain that
the Pennsylvania Eailroad cannot antagonize the interests of
New York unfairly, and must refrain from any attempt to
subordinate them to the rival interests which it also en-
deavors to serve. It is a necessary condition of its competi-
tion for the trade of New York, that it shall make its services
beneficial, and that it shall offer facilities which are not sur-
passed by those offered by other roads. But the Pennsylvania
also, through its association with the Northern Central, com-
petes with marked success for the trade of Baltimore, and took
away from that city in the year 1880 twenty-three per cent.
of the westbound freight carried by the American Trunk
Line roads. Its share in the eastbound freight was still
more considerable, being forty per cent. What is said of its
relations to New York business may therefore with equal
truth be said of its relations to the business of Baltimore : it
must hold itself above the rivalries of locality, and assume
the attitude of an impartial carrier, desirous of the favor
and custom of the whole country, and willing and anxious to















































































































































sylvania corporation, its offices are in the City of Philadelphia, 
its stocks and bonds are largely held there, and perhaps not 
largely held elsewhere in this country, and it is not improb­
able that the feelings and sympathies of those who manage 
its concerns would incline them to desire specially the growth 
and prosperity of Philadelphia above other places. But the 
road has its eastern terminus, not at Philadelphia, but on the 
harbor of New York, where it has made large and costly 
preparations to compete with the 'Central and the Erie for 
New York business. That it does compete with those roads 
successfully is shown by the enormous amount of freight 
which it moves from and carries into that city, and by the 
fact that the merchants of New York have come to look upon 
it, with entire justice, as one of their most important channels 
of communication with the West. In the year 1880 this road 
took out of New York twenty-six per cent. of the westbound 
freight carried by the Trunk roads, and delivered to it nearly 
twenty per cent. of the eastbound. While thus successfully 
bidding for the custom and favor of New York, it is plain that 
the Pennsylvania Railroad cannot antagoni.Ze the interests of 
New York unfairly, and must refrain from any attempt to 
subordinate them to the rival interests which it also en­
deavors to serve. It is a necessary condition of its competi­
tion for the trade of New York, that it shall make its services 
beneficial, and that it shall offer facilities which are not sur­
passed by those offered by other roads. But the Pennsylvania 
also, through its association with the Northern Central, com­
petes with marked success for the trade of Baltimore, and took 
away from that city in the year 1880 twenty-three per cent. 
of the westbound freight carried by the American Trunk 
Line roads. Its share in the eastbound freight was still 
more considerable, being forty per cent. What is said of its 
relations to New York business may therefore with equal 
truth be said of its relations to the business of Baltimore : it 
must hold itself above the rivalries of locality, and assume 
the attitude of an impartial carrier, desirous of the favor 
and custom of the whole country, and willing and anxious to 
serve all localities on such terms as are relatively equal and 
f'mbstantially just. 
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It is not likely that this reaching out of all the Trunk Line
roads to compete with each other in the several Atlantic
cities was contemplated when the roads were originally con-
structed ; but as the several lines have pushed their connec-
tions in the West in competition, it has been found desirable
for each to offer to its patrons the advantages of as many
markets as possible, and to carry for them, without breaking
bulk, whatever they have had for carriage in an eastward or
westward direction. Competition has thus made roads
national which were once local, and it is vain to expect that
so important a subject as that of differential rates will be
settled on the local preferences or prejudices of those who
may have authority in railroad circles. It must, therefore,
be settled either arbitrarily, by the fiat or agreement of the
transportation companies, or it must be determined by
some underlying principle. We agree with what was
said in the New York discussions and elsewhere, that any
arbitrary adjustments in disregard of such principles as
would naturally influence prices of transportation when un-
trammelled, would not, could not, and ought not to be upheld.
There should be—and as we think there must be—-some
principle by which to determine such a question, or perhaps
two or more principles acting upon and qualifying each
other.
It has been assumed in the discussions we have listened
to, that business would be invited to a city by low rates upon
its railroad lines, and that the prosperity of the city would
bear some relation to these rates. How far this assumption
is likely to be well founded, we, of course, have no more
means of judging than has the general public. But the fact
that each of the Trunk Line roads has its relations to all the
cities, and each city receives benefits from all the roads, is
sufficient to suggest some question, whether low relative rates
and large relative business will necessarily go together.
Though it is true, as we think and have said, all the roads
which compete for the business of a place must treat its in-
terests fairly, and not subordinate them to the interests of














































































































































It is not likely that this reaching out of all the Trunk Line 
roads to compete with each other in the several Atlantic 
cities was contemplated when the roads were originally con­
structed ; but as the several lines have pushed their connec­
tions in the West in competition, it has been found desirable 
for each to offer to its patrons the advantages of as many 
markets as possible, and to carry for them, without breaking 
bulk, whatever they have had for carriage in an eastward or 
westward direction. Competition has thus made roads 
national which were once local, and it is vain to expect that 
so important a subject as that of differential rates will be 
settled on the local preferences or prejudices of those who 
may have authority in railroad circles. It must, therefore, 
be settled either arbitrarily, by the fiat or agreement of the 
transportation companies, or it must be determined by 
some underlying principle. We agree with what was 
said in the New York discussions and elsewhere, that any 
arbitrary adjustments in disregard of such principles as 
would naturally influence prices of transportation when un­
trammelled, would not, could not, and ought not to be upheld. 
There should be-and as we think there must be-some 
principle by which to determine such a question, or perhaps 
two or more principles acting upon and qualifying each 
other. 
It has been assumed in the discussions we have listened 
to, that business would be invited to a city by low rates upon 
its railroad lines, and that the prosperity of the city would 
bear some relation to these rates. How far this assumption 
is likely to be well founded, we, of course, have no more 
means of judging than has the general public. But the fact 
that each of the Trunk Line roads has its relations to all the 
cities, and each city receives benefits from all the roads, is 
sufficient to suggest some question, whether low relative rates 
a.nd large relative business will necessarily go together. 
Though it is true, as we think and have said, all the roads 
which compete for the business of a place must treat its in­
terests fairly, and not subordinate them to the interests of 
rival places; yet it must be expected that they will at all 
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times have primarily in view their own interests, and that
their zeal to procure business will bear some proportion to
the anticipated profits. If New York business is most remu-
nerative, it will be sought most eagerly; if not, the railroad
managers will direct attention to that which is. Reducing
the New York rates relatively to those of Philadelphia and
Baltimore, seems, therefore, to invite the roads to favor par-
ticularly the business of the two cities last named. Estab-
lishing differential rates in favor of Philadelphia and Baltimore
holds out inducements to the railroads to favor the New York
trade. The Pennsylvania Company may be expected to de-
sire to carry freights past Philadelphia to New York if it can
be paid for the additional haul, but to prefer to leave them
in Philadelphia, if for the considerable distance from there
to New York it will be paid nothing for the transportation.
Thus what each city asks, appears to have some tendency to
enlist the selfish interests of the railroad companies against
it. We mention this among other circumstances affecting
the question, without deeming it necessary to remark upon
it further.
THE PRINCIPLES THAT SHOULD CONTKOL.
It seemed to be taken for granted, in the arguments pre-
sented to us, that the existing differentials had not been
determined on any principle, but that they were the result of
a compromise between the railroad companies, whereby they
had purchased peace between themselves. Three different
principles, however, were suggested by different parties, as
those which should control, and these found advocates in
different localities, according as, it was thought, those locali-
ties would be favored by their operation respectively. These
three principles may be designated respectively : the distance
principle, the cost principle, and the competitive principle. It
is, however, proper to say that those who advocated the first
and the second of these principles, generally agreed that the
third should not be discarded; but that it had its legitimate
place, and must have its legitimate influence also. Brief no-














































































































































times have primarily in view their own interests, and that 
their zeal to procure business will bear some proportion to 
the anticipated profits. If New York business is most remu­
nerative, it will be sought most eagerly; if not, the railroad 
managers will direct attention to that which is. Reducing 
the New York rates relatively to those of Philadelphia and 
Baltimore, seems, therefore, to invite the roads to favor par­
ticularly the business of the two cities last �amed. Estab­
lishing differential rates in favor of Philadelphia and Baltimore 
holds out inducements to the railroads to favor the New York 
trade. The Pennsylvania Company may be expected to de­
sire to carry freights past Philadelphia to New York if it can 
be paid for the additional haul, but to prefer to leave them 
in Philadelphia, if for the considerable distance from there 
to New York it will be paid nothing for the transportation. 
Thus what each city asks, appears to have some tendency to 
enlist the selfish interests of the railroad companies against 
it. We mention this among other circumstances affecting 
the question, without deeming it necessary to remark upon 
it further. 
THE PRINCIPLES THAT SHOULD CONTROL. 
It seemed to be taken for granted, in the arguments pre­
sented to us, that the existing differentials had not been 
determined on any principle, but that they were the result of 
a compromise between the railroad companies, whereby they 
had purchased peace between themselves. Three different 
principles, however, were suggested by different parties, as 
those which should control, and these found advocates in 
different localities, according as, it was thought, those locali­
ties would be favored by their operation respectively. These 
three principles may be designated respectively : the distance 
principle, the cost principle, and the competitive principle. It 
is, however, proper to say that those who advocated the first 
and the second of these principles, generally agreed that the 
third should not be discarded ; but that it had its legitimate 
place, and must have its legitimate influence also. Brief no­
tice will be taken of these three principles respectively. 
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THE DISTANCE PRINCIPLE.
It was contended by the commercial representatives of
Philadelphia and Baltimore, that freight charges on like
classes of freights between the interior and the seaboard cities
ought to be proportioned to distance. We understood them
to mean by this, that the shortest line from Chicago to each
of the Atlantic cities should be taken as the standard for
measuring the freight charges between Chicago and that city,
and that the charges for all the cities should then be deter-
mined by the mileage. By referring to the accompanying
note, it will be seen that if the mileage standard were
adopted, the freight charges between New York and Chicago
would be about ten per cent. greater than those between
Philadelphia and Chicago, and about thirteen per cent. more
than those between Baltimore and Chicago. Those between
New York and Cincinnati would be about twenty-eight per
cent. more than between Philadelphia and Cincinnati, and
about thirty-eight per cent. more than between Baltimore
and Cincinnati.* According to the average rates on grain
*DISTANCES VIA THE SHORTEST RAIL ROUTES TO
Boston. New York. Philadelphia. Baltimore.
Chicago 1,009 900 823 802
Burlington, la 1,216 1,106 1,030 995
Cincinnati.. 927 743 667 576
Columbus, 0 807 623 547 512
Cleveland 671 580 504 483
Detroit 724 673 682 661
Indianapolis. 951 810 735 700
Kansas City 1,487 1,324 1,248 1,192
Louisville 1,161 870 794 706
Memphis 1,438 1,247 1,171 1,083
Milwaukee 998 947 908 887
Omaha 1,503 1,393 1,317 1,294
St Louis 1,212 1,050 973 917
St Paul 1,418 1,308 1,232 1,211
St Joseph 1,478 1,356 1,280 1,223
Toledo 784 693 617 596
Taking Boston as the standard, New York averages twelve per cent. nearer to
these towns, Philadelphia eighteen, and Baltimore twenty-two per cent. nearer.
Between New York and Chicago the line of the Pennsylvania Railroad is forty-
seven miles shorter than that by the Erie and its connections, fifty miles shorter
than that by the New York Central and its connections, and one hundred and














































































































































THE DISTANCE PRINCIPLE. 
It was contended by the commercial representatives of 
Philadelphia and Baltimore, that freight charges on like 
classes of freights between the interior and the seaboard cities 
ought to be proportioned to distance. We understood them 
to mean by this, that the shortest line from Chicago to each 
of the Atlantic cities should be taken as the standard for 
measuring the freight charges between Chicago and that city, 
and that the charges for all the cities should then be deter­
mined by the mileage. By referring to the accompanying 
note, it will be seen that if the mileage standard were 
adopted, the freight charges between New York and Chicago 
would be about ten per cent. greater than those between 
Philadelphia and Chicago, and about thirteen per cent. morA 
than those between Baltimore and Chicago. Those between 
New York and Cincinnati would be about twenty-eight per 
cent. more than between Philadelphia and Cincinnati, and 
about thirty-eight per cent. more than between Baltimore 
• 
and Cincinnati.* According to the average rates on grain 
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Taking Boston as the standard, New York averages twelve per cent. nearer to 
these towns, Philadelphia eighteen, and Baltimore twenty-two per cent. nearer. 
Between New York and Chicago the line of the Pennsylvania Railroad is forty· 
seven miles shorter than that by the Erie and its connections, fifty miles shorter 
than that by the New York Central and its connections, and one hundred and 
fourteen miles shorter than that by the Baltimore & Ohio and its connections. 
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and provisions this year, the differentials have only been
about six and two thirds per cent. in favor of Philadelphia,
and ten per cent. in favor of Baltimore; and the distance
principle would, therefore, on an average, increase them
greatly. It was urged that it was by this principle that the
several roads, constituting a competing line, are accustomed
to apportion their joint charges, and that these very Trunk
Lines adopt it in dividing the charges upon through freights
with the roads from which they receive the freight, or to
which they deliver it. The New York representatives, on the
other hand, contended that the distance principle could not
with any justice control, for the reason that distance does not
measure either the cost or the value of the service; so that
if adopted as the standard of charges, it would be an arbi-
trary standard, and the element of equity in the rates would
be disregarded.
If there were between each of the Atlantic cities and the
interior towns only a single line of railroad communication,
some of the difficulties in the way of the application of the
distance principle, which are now obvious, would be wanting.
But, as has been said already, every one of those cities has
several lines, and would be content with no less. The sup-
posed distance principle ignores this fact: selecting the
shortest line to each city, to the disregard of the rest, and
estimating the charges in proportion to its length. It might
thus happen that the charges on freights from Chicago to the
several seaboard cities, with all their roads taken into the ac-
count, would bear no proportion whatever to the distance; and
it is certain that as between the roads serving the same city, the
supposed principle could not be applied at all, for they,
irrespective of distance, must conform to the lowest rates.
The distance apportionment would, therefore, not be an
apportionment of principle, but only of expediency; and
whether expedient or not, must depend somewhat on other
considerations, which present themselves in the practical
administration of railroad affairs.
It cannot be said, however, that distance is a circumstance














































































































































and proVIs10ns this year, the differentials have only been 
about six and two thirds per cent. in favor of Philadelphia, 
and ten per cent. in favor of Baltimore; and the distance 
principle would, therefore, on an average, increase them 
greatly. It was urged that it was by this principle that the 
several roads, constituting a competing line, are accustomed 
to apportion their joint charges, and that these very Trunk 
Lines adopt it in dividing the charges upon through freights 
with the roads from which they receive the freight, or to 
which they deliver it. The New York representatives, on the 
other hand, contended that the distance principle could not 
with any justice control, for the reason that distance does not 
measure either the cost or the value of the service ; so that 
if adopted as the standard of charges, it would be an arbi­
trary standard, and the element of equity in the rates would 
be disregarded. 
If there were between each of the Atlantic cities and the 
interior towns only a single line of railroad communication, 
some of the difficulties in·the way of the application of the 
distance principle, which are now obvious, would be wanting. 
But, as has been said already, every one of those cities has 
several lines, and would be content with no less. The sup­
posed distance principle ignores this fact : selecting the 
shortest line to each city, to the disregard of the rest, and 
estimating the charges in proportion to its length. It might 
thus happen that the charges on freights from Chicago to the 
several seaboard cities, with all their roads taken into the ac­
count, would bear no proportion whatever to the distance; and 
it is certain that as between the roads serving the same city, the 
supposed principle could not be applied at all, for they, 
irrespective of distance, must conform to the lowest rates. 
The distance apportionment would, therefore, not be an 
apportionment of principle, but only of expediency; and 
whether expedient or not, must depend somewhat on other 
considerations, which present themselYes in the practical 
administration of railroad affairs. 
It cannot be said, however, that distance is a circumstance 
without value in the determination of railroad tariffs ; it is, 
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on the other hand, one of much importance. Nearness to the
producers and consumers of the articles which it handles is
a great advantage to any city; and so far as the rivals of
New York are possessed of this advantage, they are justified
in expecting that it will be recognized. But the value of this
advantage is a question that must be determined with many
other things taken into the account, and can only be fully
solved in the tests of competition. The general fact now is
that distance does not determine railroad charges, and that
where competition is most active it influences them the least.
The distance principle does not, therefore, stand the test of
competition, and so far as we can perceive, there is no possi-
bility of establishing it except by subordinating competition
altogether to it. But to do this would require an exercise of
arbitrary authority which we do not understand those who
advocate the distance principle to advise or desire. We
must conclude, therefore, that distance cannot supply for us
the controlling principle, and that its proper influence upon
transportation charges cannot be determined either arbi-
trarily or as a matter of antecedent computation or estimate.
THE COST PRINCIPLE.
New York parties who rejected the distance principle were
inclined to favor the grading of rates by the cost of service;
and if this were done, they claimed that the differentials
would disappear altogether. Cost of service is here employed
as synonymous with the phrase cost of moving freight, which
is most commonly used. The latter phrase, however, is used
in two very different senses, which it may be important to
distinguish in order to avoid misconception. Eailroad com-
panies use the phrase for their own purposes when making
reports to their stockholders or for the public under the re-
quirements of State laws. In such reports cost of moving
freight will be understood to be the actual outlay by the rail-
road company in moving its freight over a completed and
equipped road. This outlay will embrace the cost of fuel,
the compensation to the regular freight agents, to freight














































































































































on the other hand, one of much importance. Nearness to the 
producers and consumers of the articles which it handles is 
a great advantage to any city ; and so far as the rivals of 
New York are possessed of this advantage, they ai·e justified 
in expecting that it will be recognized. But the value of this 
advantage is a question that must be determined with many 
other things taken into the account, and can only be fully 
solved in the tests of competition. The general fact now is 
that distance does not determine railroad charges, and that 
where competition is most active it influences them the least. 
The distance principle does not, therefore, stand the test of 
competition, and so far as we can perceive, there is no possi­
bility of establishing it except by subordinating competition 
altogether to it. But to do this would require an exercise of 
arbitrary authority which we do not understand those who 
advocate the distance principle to advise or desire. We 
must conclude, therefore, that distance cannot supply for us 
the controlling principle, and that its proper influence upon 
transportation charges cannot be determined either arbi­
trarily or as a matter of antecedent computation or estimate. 
THE COST PRINCIPLE. 
New York parties who rejected the distance principle were 
inclined t.o favor the grading of rates by the cost of service ; 
and if this were done, they claimed that the differentials 
would disappear altogether. Cost of service is here employed 
as synonymous with the phrase cost of moving freight, which 
is most commonly used. The latter phrase, however, is used 
in two very different senses, which it may be important to 
distinguish in order to avoid misconception. Railroad com­
panies use the phrase for their own purposes when making 
reports to their stockholders or for the public under the re­
quirements of State laws. In such reports cost of moving 
freight will be understood to be the actual outlay by the rail­
road company in moving its freight over a completed and 
equipped road. This outlay will embrace the cost of fuel, 
the compensation to the regular freight agents, to freight 
solicitors, if any, to the servants employed to handle the 
16
freight and govern and move the trains. It must also embrace
the necessary expense of keeping good the freight equipment,
and it should include a fair proportion of all such expenses of
the company as are incurred for the freight and passenger
traffic in common, such as repairs of track, taxes, official
salaries, legal expenses, office expenses, general advertising,
etc. To all these must be added the cost of insurance against
losses to freight and freight equipment by casualties of all
descriptions, or of making good such losses. If all these
items are added together, and the sum total is divided by the
number of tons of freight moved one mile upon the road, we
have as the result the average cost of transporting a ton of
freight for one mile of distance.
The report which gives these items will also give others
that, as between the railroad company and its patrons, must
be understood as constituting a part of the cost of service.
If the company owes debts, the interest paid upon these
should be included; if it has made dividends to its stock-
holders, the amount should be included also. Indeed, it is
generally conceded that the cost of service should rightfully
and equitably be made to include a f;iir return in interest or
dividends on the cost of the railroad investment; though as
to what return is fair and reasonable, differences in opinion
are held and expressed. But for our present purposes it is
sufficient to leave any such differences out of view, and to
speak in general terms of the cost principle as that which
would measure the railroad charges by the cost of service,
and which would make the cost of service embrace the actual
outlay of the railroad company as above explained, and a fair
return in interest or dividends on the cost of the road and its
equipment.
To show that the cost principle would be to the advantage
of New York, it became necessary to show that the cost of
transporting freight between New York and Chicago was or
ought to be less than the cost between Philadelphia and
Chicago, or Baltimore and Chicago, or at least that it was not
greater. But upon this point, unfortunately, the information














































































































































freight and govern and move the trains. It must also embrace 
the necessary expense of keeping good the freight equipment, 
and it should include a fair proportion of all such expenses of 
the company as are incurred for the freight· and passenger 
traffic in common, such as repairs of track, taxes, official 
salaries, legal expenses, office expenses, general advertising, 
etc. To all these must be 8.dded the. cost of insurance against 
losses to freight and freight equipment by casualties of all 
descriptions, or of making good such losses. If all these 
items are added together, and the sum total is divided by the 
number of tons of freight moved one mile upon the road, we 
have as the result the average cost of transporting a ton of 
freight for one mile of distance. 
The report which gives these items will also give others 
that, as between the railroad company and its patrons, must 
be understood as constituting a part of the cost of service. 
If the company owes debts, the interest paid upon these 
should be included ; if it has made dividends to 1ts stock­
holders, the amount should be included also.' Indeed, it is 
generally conceded t.hat the cost of service sll.ould rightfully 
and equitably be made to include a fair retur� in interest or 
dividends on the cost of the railroad investment ; though as 
to what return is fair aud reasonable, differences in opinion 
are held and expressed. But for our present purposes it is 
sufficient to leave any such differences out of view, .and to 
speak in general terms of the cost principle as that which 
would measure the railroad charges by the cost of service, 
and which would make the cost of service embrace the actual 
outlay of the railroad company as above explained, and a f�ir 
retmn in i11ten'st or dividends on the cost of the road an<l its 
e1p1ip11wnt. 
To Hh< l\Y that the cost principle would be to the advantage 
uf New York, it became necessary to show that the cost of • 
transporting freight between New York and Chicago was or 
ought to be less than the oost between Philadelphia and 
Chicago, or Baltimore and Chicago, or at least that it was not 
greater. But upon this point, unfortun�tely, the information 
that was produced before us did not appear to be very pre-
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cise or very accurate. The expressions of opinion were in-
deed clear and strong, but they were generally supported by
argument and inference rather than by evidence. Our atten-
tion was not directed to .official reports or figures, where or
by which the actual cost was set forth, but rather to the
topographical features of the country between New York and
the head of Lake Michigan, which it was said offered admir-
able facilities for the construction of railroads, which would
be economical in original outlay, and economical also in their
operation. No such economical road, it was said, had been
or could be constructed further to the south, and the unfa-
vorable gradients and curvatures on the Pennsylvania and
the Baltimore <fe Ohio roads more than deprive them of all
the advantages which they possess in shorter distance. It
was also urged that another important circumstance should
be taken into the account when the cost is being estimated.
By far the larger portion of all the freight carried by the
Trunk Lines is eastward bound. When cost is considered the
probability of return freights must be taken into the account,
since to whatever extent the cars which convey freight to the
seaboard must be returned without loading, the cost of the re-
turn must be reckoned as part of the cost of transporting
the eastbound freight. And it was confidently asserted that
the probability of obtaining remunerative return freights was
much greater at New York than elsewhere on the Atlantic
coast.
To make out the case of more favorable lines and gradients
between Chicago and New York, the route is required, after
it leaves the shore of Lake Erie, to follow substantially the
course of the Erie Canal to the Hudson, and thence down
that river. By that route a road has been constructed
with few unfavorable grades and curves, and this road
no doubt is or can be operated with much greater economy
than would be possible if its line were through a mountainous
region. But if we take this as the route for freight
transportation between New York and the interior, and
compare it with the routes to Philadelphia and Baltimore














































































































































c1se or very accurate. The expressions of opm10n were in­
deed clear and strong, but they were generally supported by 
argument and inference rather than by evidence. Our atten­
tion was not directed to .official reports or figures, where or 
by which the actual cost was set forth, but rather to the 
topographical features of the country between New York and 
the head of Lake Michigan, which it was said offered admir­
able facilities for the construction of railroads, which would 
be economical in original outlay, and economical also in their 
operation. No such economical road, it was said, had been 
or could be constructed further to the south, and the unfa­
vorable gradients and curvatures on the Pennsylvania and 
the Baltimore & Ohio roads more than deprive them of all 
the advantages which they possess in shorter distance. It 
was also urged that another important circumstance should 
be taken into the account when the cost is being estimated� 
By far the larger portion of all the freight carried by the 
Trunk Lines is eastward bound. When cost is considered the 
probability of return freights must be taken into the account, 
since to whatever extent the cars which convey freight to the 
seaboard must be returned without loading, the cost of the re­
turn must be reckoned as part of the cost of transporting 
the eastbound freight. And it was confidently asserted that. 
the probability of obtaining remunerative return freights was. 
much greater at New York than elsewhere on the Atlantio 
coast. 
To make out the case of more favorable lines and gradients 
between Chicago and New York, the route is required, after 
it leaves the shore of Lake Erie,' to follow substantially the 
course of the Erie Canal to the Hudson, and thence down 
that river. By . that route a road has been constructed 
with few unfavorable grades and curves, and this road 
no doubt is or can be operated with much greater economy 
than would be possibfe'. if its line were through a mountainous 
region. But if we take this as the route for freight 
transportation between New York and the interior, and 
compare it with the routes to Philadelphia and Baltimore 
over the roads which carry most freights to those cities re-
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spectively, we commit the mistake of directing our attention
exclusively to the one road which possesses this favorable line,
and ignoring altogether the fact that New York has other
roads which it is desirable for its interest should live and
prosper, and that over each of them the active and energetic
merchants and manufacturers of that city are seeking the
business of the interior and inviting its custom. Every one
of those roads brings to New York a large amount of trade
which would not be obtained without its facilities ; and it
seems certain that New York cannot afford to ignore any one
road, any more when it is settling its grievances with rivals
than when estimating advantages over them. If, therefore,
it be demonstrated that the New York Central and its con-
necting roads can transport western products from the interior
to New York as cheaply as the more southern roads can move
them to Baltimore or Philadelphia, it may not follow that the
interest of New York would be subserved by the adoption of
the cost principle and the bringing of the charges on freight
transportation to and from New York to the test of what the
Central could afford. Prudence would require that at least the
probable consequences should be considered; and if among
these consequences should be the possibility of some other
line to New York being found unable to endure the test of the
cost principle, this of itself ought to raise some doubt whether
the city of New York could be interested in establishing
it. Now, the very claim that is made in behalf of the New
York Central route, as one of remarkable economy, assumes
that the Pennsylvania route is less economical; and the as-
sertion that the Central can carry from Chicago to New York
as cheaply as the Pennsylvania can carry from Chicago to
Philadelphia, contains within it—since the less is contained
in the greater—that the Central can carry from Chicago to
New York cheaper than the Pennsylvania, which only reaches
New York by carrying past Philadelphia, can possibly do.
The application of the cost principle, if made under such cir-
cumstances, must force the Pennsylvania to this alternative:
that it must carry at rates which will not give to the com-














































































































































spectively, we commit the mistake of directing our attention 
exclusively to the one road which possesses this favorable line, 
and ignoring altogether the fact that New York has other 
roads which it is desirable for its interest should live and 
prosper, and that over each of them the active and energetic 
merchants and manufacturers of that city are seeking the 
business of the interior and inviting its custom. Every one 
of those roads b�ings to New York a large amount of trade 
which would not be obtained without its facilities ; and it 
seems certain that New York cannot afford to ignore any one 
road, any more when it is settling its grievances with rivals 
than when estimating advantages over them. If, therefore, 
it be demonstrated that the New York Central and its con­
necting roads can transport western products from the interior 
to New York as cheaply as the more southern roads can move 
them to Baltimore or Philadelphia, it may not follow that the 
interest of New York would be subserved by the adoption of 
the cost principle and the bringing of the charges on freight 
transportation to and from New York to the test of what the 
Central could afford. Prudence would require that at least the 
probable consequences should be considered; and if among 
these consequences should be the possibility of some other 
line to New York being found unable to endure the test of the 
cost principle, this of itself ought to raise some doubt whether 
the city of New York could be interested in establishing 
it. Now, the very claim that is made in behalf of the New 
York Central route, as one of remarkable economy, assumes 
that the Pennsylvania route is less economical; and the as­
sertion that the Central can carry from Chicago to New York 
as cheaply as the Pennsylvania can carry from Chicago to 
Philadelphia, contains within it-since the less is contained 
in the greater-that the Central can carry from Chicago to 
New York cheaper than the Pennsylvania, which only reaches 
New York by carrying past Philadelphia, can possibly do. 
The application of the cost principle, if made under such cir­
cumstances, must force the Pennsylvania to this alternative: 
that it must carry at rates which will not give to the com­
pany a fair return in profits, or it must give up competition 
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ior New York business ; and the Erie, whose line is also as-
sumed to be less favorable than that of the Central, might be
compelled to face the same alternative. It probably would
not be contended that either the Grand Trunk or the Balti-
more & Ohio, whose lines to New York, through connecting
roads, are so much longer than those of the Pennsylvania,
could compete at all for New York business under a strict
application of the cost principle. The natural tendency of
its application would, therefore, be in the direction of throw-
ing upon one of the existing lines to New York the bulk of
the New York business, to the destruction of the others, and
to the final destruction of competition. It is not to be as-
sumed that this is what New York desires. Every great city
.finds it conducive to its prosperity to secure as many of these
.avenues of trade and travel as possible ; and it is certainly
not more important to gain a new line than to preserve one
-already in existence, and already equipped with all those
powers of usefulness which a new project can only promise
at some time in the future. If, therefore, the cost principle
were to be adopted for regulating the charges as between the
competing cities, it would seem that New York ought to
bring into the calculation not one road only, and that the one
.most economical in construction and operation, but all the
roads which contribute to its prosperity, and which it desires
to retain.
At Philadelphia and Baltimore it is asserted with great
confidence that over no one of the New York roads can
freights be conveyed as cheaply, from Chicago to New York,
-as they can be over the Pennsylvania, and the Baltimore &
Ohio roads to Philadelphia and Baltimore respectively. For
this confidence certain facts are stated which are supposed
to be sufficient to produce the result, and official reports are
cited as evidence that the result has followed. The favorable
lines of the New York Central, and its affiliated roads, are
admitted; but it is contended that all the advantage of these
is more than neutralized by greater distance and the greater
,cost of fuel to the New York roads over those to the south of














































































































































1or New York business; and the Erie, whose line is also as­
�sumed to be less favorable than that of the Central, might be 
compelled to face the same alternative. It probably would 
not be contended that either the Grand Trunk or the Balti­
more & Ohio, whose lines to New York, through connecting 
.roads, are so much longer than those of the Pennsylvania, 
-could compete at all for New York business under a strict 
application of the cost principle. The natural tendency of 
its application would, therefore, be in the direction of throw­
ing upon one of the existing lines to New York the bulk of 
the New York business, to the destruction of the others, and 
to the final destruction of competition. It is not to be as­
sumed that this is what New York desires. Every great city 
.finds it conducive to its prosperity to secure as many of these 
a.venues of trade and travel as possible; and it is certainly 
not more important to gain a new line than to preserve one 
.already in existence, and already equipped with all those 
powers of usefulness which a new project can only promise 
.at some time in the future. If, therefore, the cost principle 
were to be adopted for regulating the charges as between the 
competing cities, it would seem that New York ought to 
bring into the calculation not one road only, and that the one 
.most economical in construction and operation, but all the 
.roads which contribute to its prosperity, and which it desires 
.to retain. 
At Philadelphia and Baltimore it is asserted with great 
-confidence that over no one of the New York roads can 
freights be conveyed as cheaply, from Chicago to New York, 
.as they can be over the Pennsylvania, and the Baltimore & 
Ohio roads to Philadelphia and Baltimore respectively. For 
this confidence certain facts are stated which are supposed 
to be sufficient to produce the result, and official reports are 
-cited as evidence that the result has followed. The favorable 
lines of the New York Central, and its affiliated roads, are 
admitted; but it .is contended that all the advantage of these 
is more than neutralized by greater distance and the greater 
-cost of fuel to the New York roads over those to the south of 
-them. The Pennsylvania, and the Baltimore & Ohio roads 
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find the coal, which represents their motive power, in beds
at various points on their lines, and can take it up for use at
little more than the cost of handling ; while the New York
roads, on the other hand, and especially the Central, must
transport the coal for a long distance at a cost two or three
times as great. This cost constitutes a very considerable
part of the total expense of moving freight, and it cannot be
overlooked or treated as of little moment.
The official figures to which attention was called to show
the greater cost on the New York lines are to be found in the
reports of the New York Central, the Erie and the Pennsyl-
vania, made by the directors to the stockholders, to show the
operation of the roads for the years 1880 and 1881. In those
reports estimates are made of the cost to the companies re-
spectively of moving one ton of freight for one mile of dis-
tance, omitting from the calculation the items of interest and
profits. The reports, as will be seen on referring to the note
in the margin, make a very iinfavorable showing for New
York ;* and if the figures told the whole story, and if we
could be assured that they were made by each company on
the same basis, they would go very far toward justifying the
other cities in the claims they make. But, unfortunately, these
reports are, for our purpose, of little value. They cover too
much in some respects, and too little in others, to give us
the information we need. 1. The Trunk Line companies re-
port the cost over their own roads only, and do not include
the cost over the feeder roads ; but what we need to know is
the cost of transportation over the whole line from western
points to the seaboard. 2. The companies in their reports do
not discriminate between the cost of transporting local freight
and through freight, but endeavor only to give the average
cost of moving both. But here the reports embrace too
much for our purposes, for on this inquiry we are interested
* Cost of moving freight per ton for one mile of distance:
On the New York Central, 1880, 5.41 mills. 1881, 5.62 mills.
On the Erie, " 5.34 " " 5.29 "
On the Pennsylvania, " 4.74 " " 4.37 "














































































































































find the coal, which represents their motive power, in beds 
at various points on their lines, and can take it up for use at 
little more than the cost of handling; while the New York 
roads, on the other hand, and especially the Central, must 
transport the coal for a long distance at a cost two or three 
times as great. This cost constitutes a very considerable 
part of the total expense of moving freight, and it cannot be 
overlooked or treated as of little moment. 
The official figures to which attention was called to show 
the greater cost on the New York lines are to be found in the 
reports of the New York Central, the Erie and the Pennsyl­
vania, made by the directors to the stockholders, to show the 
operation of the roads for the years 1880 and 1881. In those 
reports estimates are made of the cost to the companies re­
spectively of moving one ton of freight for oiie mile of dis­
tance, omitting from the calculation the items of interest and 
profits. The reports, as will be seen on referring to the note 
in the margin, make a very unfavorable showing for New 
York;* and if the figures told the whole story, and if we 
could be assured that they were made by each company on 
the same basis, they would go very far toward justifying the 
other cities in the claims they make. But, unfortunately, these 
reports are� for our purpose, of little value. They cover too 
·much in ,some respects, and too little in others, to give us 
the information we need. 1. The Trunk Line companies re­
port the cost over their own roads only, and do not include 
the cost over the feeder roads; but what we need to know is 
the cost of transportation over the whole line from western 
points to the seaboard. 2. The companies in their reports do 
not discriminate between the cost of transporting local freight 
and through freight, but endeavor only to give the average 
cost of moving both. But here the reports embrace too 
much for our purposes, for. on
_ 
this inquiry we are interested 
* Cost of moving frei�ht per ton for one mile of distance: 
On the New York Central, 1880, 6.41 mille. 1 8 8 1, 6.62 mills. 
On the Erie, " 6.34 " " 6.29 " 
On the Pennsylvania, " 4.'14 " " 4.3'1 
'' 
No corresponding figures are given in the reports of the Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. 
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only in the cost of moving through freight. If the freights
over all the roads were similar in kind, and if the proportion
of through freight to way freight were nearly the same on all,
the report of average cost might be accepted as indicating the
proportionate cost to each road of its through freights. But
we must take notice of the fact, which is matter of common
knowledge, that the character of local freight is exceedingly
diverse on the different roads, and that the cost of handling
is far from being uniform. If one company, for example,
handles coal in large quantities as way freight, loading a train
completely at one station, and moving it to another for com-
plete unloading, the cost of such business would furnish very
unsafe and unreliable means of comparison with that of the
local freight of miscellaneous articles, which another road
might pick up in small quantities at many way stations, and
deliver at as many more. But these railroad companies, unfor-
tunately, have as yet agreed upon no uniform method of keep-
ing accounts, whereby they may determine, by the same stand-
ards, the actual outlay of the roads in moving their freights.
It would seem that there ought to be no differences in this par-
ticular ; but the official reports sometimes disclose on exami-
nation that the diversities are very considerable, and are not
infrequently met with in the accounts of the same company.
One company, for example, when it is able to make such
betterments as station houses, warehouses and side tracks
from its current receipts without increasing its indebtedness,
may charge the cost to operating expenses, while another
under similar circumstances would charge them to construc-
tion account, and still another would include them in operat-
ing expenses for the time being, and at the end of several
years perhaps transfer them to construction account for the
purposes of a new issue of stock. Evidences of these differ-
ent methods of procedure appeared in reports of different
companies, which were made use of for their information or
for the purposes of illustration before us. It is no doubt
undesirable that there should be this diversity in practice;
but while it exists it is necessary to take notice of it. If














































































































































only in the cost of moving through freight. If the freights 
over all the roads were similar in kind, and if the proport�on 
of through freight to way freight were nearly the same on all, 
the report of average cost might be accepted as indicating the 
proportionate cost to each road of its through freights. But 
we must take notice of the fact, which is matter of common 
knowledge, that the character of local freight is exceedingly 
diverse on the different roads, and that the cost of handling 
is far from being uniform. If one company, for example, 
handles coal in large quantities as way freight, loading a. train 
completely at one station, and moving it to another for com­
plete unloading, the cost of such business would furnish very 
unsafe and unreliable means of comparison with that of the 
local freight of miscellaneous articles, which another road 
might pick up in small quantities at many way stations, and 
deliver at as many more. But these railroad companies, unfor­
tunately, have as yet agreed upon no uniform method of keep­
ing accounts, whereby they may determine, by the same stand­
ards, the actual outlay of the roads in moving their freights. 
It would seem that there ought to be no differences in this par­
ticular ; but the official reports sometimes disclose on exami­
nation that the diversities are very considerable, and are not 
infrequently met with in the accounts of the same company. 
One company, for example, when it is able to make such 
betterments as station houses, warehouses and side tracks 
from its current receipts without increasing its indebtedness, 
may charge the cost to operating expenses, while another 
under similar circumstances would charge them to construc­
tion account, and still another would include them in operat­
ing expenses for the time being, and at the end of several 
years perhaps transfer them to construction account for the 
purposes of a new issue of stock. Evidences of these differ­
ent methods of procedure appeared in reports of different 
companies, which were made u�e of for their information or 
for the purposes of illustration before us. It is no doubt 
undesirable that there should be this diversity in practice; 
but while it exists it is necessary .to take notice of it. If 
concert of action among railroad managers could bring about 
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a uniform system. of accounts, so that the official reports
based upon them, which are made periodically for the infor-
mation of shareholders, might give valuable and reliable in-
formation and means of accurate comparison to the public as
well, the change in methods would be likely to prevent many
misconceptions and misconstructions of corporate action
which now arise in the public mind, and which lead to both-
public and corporate annoyances.
For all the reasons assigned, we are without reliable in-
formation by which to apply the cost principle in the regu-
lation of charges of transportation between the Atlantic cities
and the interior, and we cannot say that the application
would be to the advantage of New York. Prima fade the
case seems to be against New York, especially when the
Pennsylvania Railroad, which constitutes one of its most im-
portant lines, is taken into the account. It is very manifest
that that railroad can leave freights at Philadelphia more
cheaply than it can transport them the additional eighty-
seven miles to New York, and probably it can deliver them
for still less at Baltimore, since the unfavorable grades of
the road, to which much importance was attached in the
New York arguments, are all passed before Harrisburgh is
reached, and from that point the line made use of by the
Pennsylvania to reach Baltimore, is shorter than the line to
Philadelphia.
The favorable influence which the concentration of foreign
commerce at New York ought to have upon railroad rates
between that city and the interior, may perhaps be something,
for freight tariffs ought to be, and will be, arranged with re-
gard to the probability of compensating freights in both di-
rections. When a railroad company can have freights in one
direction only, and must return its cars empty, it must neces-
sarily make the freights pay for the cost of the return. In
the eastern and western transportation we have an illustra-
tion of this state of things. It is matter of familiar knowl-
edge, that much the largest proportion of freight is eastward
bound, and that large numbers of unloaded cars are con-














































































































































a· uniform system of accounts, so that the official reports 
based upon them, which are made periodically for the infor­
mation of shareholders, might give valuable and reliable in­
formation and means of accurate comparison to the public as 
well, the change in methods would be likely to prevent many 
misconceptions and misconstructions of corporate action 
which now arise in the public mind, and which lead to both. 
public and corporate annoyances. 
For all the reasons assigned, we are without reliable in­
formation by which to apply the cost principle in the regu­
lation of charges of transportation between the Atlantic cities 
and the interior, and we cannot say that the application 
would be to the advantage of New York. Prima facie the 
case seems to be against New York, especially when the 
Pennsylvania Railroad, which constitutes one of its most im-· 
portant lines, is taken into the account. It is very manifest. 
that that railroad can leave freights at Philadelphia more 
cheaply than it can transport them the additional eighty­
seven miles to New York, and probably it can deliver them 
for still less at Baltimore, since the unfavorable grades of 
the road, to which much importance was attached in the 
New York arguments, are all passed before Harrisburgh is 
reached, and from that point the line made use of by the 
Pennsylvania to reach Baltimore, is shorter than the line �o 
Philadelphia. 
The favorable influence which the concentration of foreign 
commerce at New York ought to have upon railroad rates 
between that city and the interior, may perhaps be something,. 
for freight tariffs ought to be, and will be, arranged with re­
gard to the probability of compensating freights in both di­
rections. When a railroad company can have freights in one 
direction only, and must return its cars empty, it must neces­
sarily make the freights pay for the cost of the return. In 
the eastern and western tran�portation we have an illustra­
tion of this state of things. It is matter of familiar knowl­
edge, that much the largest proportion of freight is eastward 
bound, and that large numbers of unloaded cars are con­
stantly being sent west over all the roads. If the course of 
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trade were such, that any one of the Atlantic cities sent out
by rail as much freight as it received, its advantage over
the others would be obviously very great Kailroad
companies could afford to make much better rates upon
all freights bound to the city from which they were cer-
tain of compensating return loads. It is proper, therefore,
that railroad companies should take into consideration the
condition of things in this regard, and every participant in
foreign commerce has a right to expect that this will be
done. We have therefore directed our own attention to the
differences in the freights received and those sent out by the
four leading Atlantic seaboard cities over the four American
Trunk Lines, and have given in a marginal note the aggregates
for the year 1880, which will be sufficient for the purposes of
approximate comparison.* The table shows that the pro-
portion of freight sent out from New York over these roads,
when compared with that which is received from them, is
considerably greater than the proportion at either Baltimore
or Philadelphia, but it is nevertheless only as one to four
and a quarter, and it is manifest that not only must a large
proportion of all the cars which go loaded to New York re-
turn without loads, but that a much more considerable num-
ber must so return from New York than from either of the
other cities.
While, therefore, New York has an advantage over its
rivals, in the larger proportion of westbound to eastbound
freight, the advantage, if estimated by the bulk, is not very
great. And it must be borne in mind that these four cities
do not by any means furnish to the roads all their west-
*Preight Tonnage by the four American Trunk Line roads (or the year 1880 :
HECB1YED. SENT.




As the business with the Grand Trunk of Canada is not covered by this state-
ment, it will be readily understood that the statement is not so favorable to Boston














































































































































trade were such, that any one of the Atlantic cities sent out 
by ra.il as much freight as it received, its advantage over 
the others would be obviously very great. Railroad 
.companies could afford to make much better rates upon 
all frehrhts bound to the city from which they were cer­
tain of compensating return loads. It is proper, therefore, 
that railroad companies should take into consideration the 
condition of things in this regard, and every participant iii 
foreign commerce has a right to expect that this will be 
done. we have therefore directed our own attention to the 
differences in the freights received and those sent out by the 
four leading Atlantic seaboard cities over the four American 
Trunk Lines, and have given in a marginal note the aggregates 
for the year 1880, which will be sufficient for the purposes of 
approximate comparison.* The table shows that the pro­
portion of freight sent out from New York over these roads, 
when compared with that which is received from them, is 
considerably greater than the proportion at either Baltimore 
or Philadelphia, but it is nevertheless only as one to four 
and a quarter, and it is manifest that not only must a large 
proportion of all the cars which go loaded to New York re­
turn without loads, but that a much more considerable num­
ber must so return from New York than from either of the 
other cities. 
While, therefore, New York has an advantage over its 
rivals, in the larger proportion of westbound to eastbound 
freight, the advantage, if estimated by the bulk, is not very 
great. And it must be borne in mind that these four cities 
do not by any means furnish to the roads all their west-
*Freight Tonnage by the four AmeriC11.n Trunk Line roads for the year 1880 : 
New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 
Boston . . . • . • . . . . . . • • • • • • . . . 
Philadelphia . • • . . . . . . . • • . . . . 
Baltimore . • . . . • • . . . . . . . . • . .  
l!.ECll:I V BD. 
4,266, 830 
9 1 3 , 8 8 7  
1 , 5 53,38 1 
1, 569, 2 5 1  
BENT. 
1,022, 6 1 2 
309,232 
299,4 7 4  
241 , 690 
As the business with the Grand Trunk of Canada is not covered by this state­
ment, it will be readily understood that the statemeut is not so favorable to Boston 
as it should be, as its business with the Grand Trunk is very large. 
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bound freight, but that they take large quantities from other
towns along their line. It may be that New York westbound
freights average highest in the freight tariffs, but even then
the relative advantage of New York will probably be less con-
siderable than some of its advocates have supposed. And
on a careful examination of all the arguments advanced at
New York, we are not satisfied that a strict application of the
cost principle, if it should be found susceptible of applica-
tion, would be likely. to benefit the trade of that city in its
rivalry with the other Atlantic cities.
But if the exact cost of transporting freight by rail were
attainable, could it be made .the standard whereby to measure
the charges as between competing cities ? We do not consider
now what might be just and right as between a railroad company
and its patrons if the case of any railroad company could be
taken up and considered by itself apart from all others, but of
what is practicable in view of existing facts. If the cost prin-
ciple could be applied, we do not pee how the railroad companies
of the country could justly complain of it. If they could all
receive for the transportation service the cost of the service, as
above explained, they would benefit their average condition
very greatly by accepting it, for they are not now receiving
on an average anything near the average legal interest of the
country on the cost of their investments.* Many of the com-
panies—perhaps the majority of them—in order to realize cost
would be compelled to increase their charges very considerably,
while others, including perhaps some of these Trunk Lines, might
be called upon for a reduction. The general result would be, not
a diminution of charges, but an increase; and it is hardly prob-
able that the country at large would be satisfied witli the change,
* In Poor's Manual the aggregate cost of the railroads of this country and their
equipment to 1881, is given at $4,653,609,297. The railroad companies paid in
1880 in dividends, $77,115,410; and for interest on bonded debt, $107,866,328.
To 1882 the cost was $5,577,996,931. There was paid in 1881 in dividends,
$93,344,200, and for interest $128,587,302. It will be seen that the dividends
and interest together are about four per cent. on the cost of the roads and equip-
ment ; the dividends being much the smaller part. No doubt there is much
" watered " stock, and a large allowance may be made therefor, without affecting














































































































































bound freight, but that they take large quantities from other 
towns along their line. It may be that New York westbound 
freights average highest in the freight tariffs, but even then 
the relative advantage of New York will probably be less con­
siderable than some of its advocates have supposed. And 
on a careful examination of all the arguments advanced at 
New York, we are not satisfied that a strict application of the 
cost principle, if it should be found susceptible of applica­
tion, would be likely. to benefit the trade of that city in it.a 
rivalry with the other Atlantic cities. 
B ut if the exact cost of transporting freight by rail were 
attainable, could it be made _the standard whereby to measure 
the charges as between competing cities ? We do not consider 
now what might be j ust and right as between a railroad company 
and its patrons if the case of any rai ll'Oad company could be 
taken up and considered by itself apart from all others, but of 
what is  practicable i n  view of existing facts. If the cost prin· 
ciple could be applit·d, we do not �ee how the railroad companies 
of the country could j ustly complain of it. If they could all 
receive for the transportation service the cost of the service, as 
above explained , they would benefit their average condition 
very greatly by accepting it, for they are not now receiving 
on an average anything near the average legal interest of the 
country on the cost of their in vestments.* Many of the com­
panies-perhaps the majority of them-in order to realize cost 
would be compelled to i ncrease their charges very considerably, 
while others, including perhaps some of these Trunk Lines, might 
be called upon for a reduction. The general result would be, not · 
a diminution of charges, but an increase ; and it is hardly prob­
able that the country at large. would be satisfied with the change, 
* In Poor's Manual the aggregate cost of the railroads of this country l!-nd their 
equipment to 1 88 1 ,  is given at $!, 653,609, 2 9 7 .  The railroad compan ies paid in 
1 880 in dividends, $7 7 , 1 1 5 , 4 1 0 ; and for interest on bonded debt, $ 1 0 7 , 866,328. 
To 1882 the cost was $5, 5 7 7,996,93 1 .  There was paid in 1 8 8 1  in dividt1nds, 
$93,344, 200, and for interest $128,587,302.  It will . be seen that the dividends 
and interest together are about four per cent. on the cost of the roads and equip­
ment ; the dividends being much the smaller part. No doubt there is much 
" watered " stock, and a large allowance may be made therefor, without alfecting 
the accuracy of the statement in the text. 
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though it might affect particular localities favorably. Moreover,
we are to consider that the question of the application of the
cost standard to railroad charges arises for discussion and settle-
ment after cities have been built, routes established, canals made
and railroads constructed; and that the solution of the question
may affect all these beneficially or otherwise to an extent that
is beyond present calculation. We have not an unsettled
country before us to plan and make laws for, whose people when
they select their homes and places of business can calculate the
result of existing rules and regulations upon the towns they
build, or the industries they establish; but the towns already
,exist, and have been created at immense cost in view of advan-
tages which were supposed to make them attractive and desirable
as locations for trade and commerce; and their existing import-
ance as the homes of great numbers of people, and as the centres
of vast manufactures and immense exchanges gives them claims
upon the country and upon those who have in any degree the
material interests of the country in charge, and gives them
powers of defence also when assailed in the rivalry of business
which are not to be overlooked or lightly regarded.
These several towns, it is true, came into existence under cir-
cumstances which may be different from those which now sur-
round them ; and in view of advantages, which in mamr cases
have been rendered comparatively unimportant by subsequent
improvements and inventions—as canal and river navigation in
many parts of the country has been rendered unimportant by
the invention of the locomotive and the iron road—but the
towns themselves, their people and their business, remain as great
and sturdy facts, which neither the country can overlook, nor the
government of the country, nor any of its public agencies. The
continued existence of these towns is to be assumed, and their
welfare is to be calculated for when laws are made, or regula-
tions having the effect of laws are established. It would be as
inadmissible and as unjust deliberately to plan and arrange for
the gradual destruction of a great city through the slow but
certain annihilation of its business, as it would be to bring de-
struction upon it by fire or pestilence; and we are not to con-














































































































































though it might affect particular localities favorably. Moreover, 
we are to consider that the question of the application of the 
cost standard to railroad charges arises for discussion and settle­
ment after cities have been built, routes established, canals made 
and railroads constructed ; and that the solution of the question 
may affect all these beneficially or otherwise to an extent that 
is beyond present calculation. We have not an un settled 
·country before us to plan and make laws for, whose people when 
they select their homes and places of business can calculate the 
:result  of existing rules and regulations upon the towns they · 
I 
build, or the industries they establish ; but the towns already 
·exist, and have been created at immense cost in view of advan­
tages which were supposed to make them attractive and desirable 
as locations for trade and commerce ; and their existing import· 
ance as the homes of great numbers of people, and ns the centres 
·of vast manufactures and immense exchanges gives them claims 
upon the country and upon those who have in any degree the 
material interests of the country in charge, and gives them 
powers of defence also when assailed in the rivalry of business 
which are not to be overlooked or lightly regarded. 
'l'hese several towns, it is true, came into existence under cir­
cumstances which may be different from those which now sur­
round them ; and in view of advantages, which in many cases 
have been rendered comparatively unimportant by subsequent 
improvements and inventions-as canal and river navigation in 
many parts of the country has been rendered unimportant by 
the invention of the locomotive and the iron road-but the 
towns themselves, their people and their business, remain as great 
and sturdy facts, which neither the country can overlook, nor the 
government of the country, nor any of its public agencies. The 
continued existence of these towns is  to be assumed, and their 
welfare is to be calculated for when laws are made, or regula­
tions having the effect of laws are established. It would be as 
inadmissible and as unjust deliberately to plan and arrange for 
the gradual destruction of a great city t hrough the slow but 
<:!ertain annihilation of its business, as it would be to bring de­
struction upon it by fire or pestilence ; and we are not to con­
�emplate with complacency an offence of that nature against 
organized society. While it is not the province of government.
to build up cities for its people, it is its plain duty to permit the
cities the people build to live; and it should so shape its own.
action as to allow every town, as far as possible and reasonable,
to avail itself of all its natural and acquired advantages in add-
ing to the prosperity, happiness and comfort of the local com-
munity. This seems too plain and indisputable a proposition to-
be contested by any official authority or public agency.
In a certain sense railroad companies are public agencies, and
in some degree they exercise powers which are quasi govern-
mental. They make regulations for their business to which the
general public are expected to conform; and these regulations
are, in some respects, as important as the police laws established
by the State itself. Among these are the regulations respecting
charges for railroad service. According as these are heavy or
light upon the traffic of a particular locality, its trade is likely
to decline or prosper, and so dependent is commerce upon rail-
roads that the growth of a town is likely to bear some propor-
tion to the extent of its railroad facilities, and the liberality with
which it is treated by railroad managers.
We should consider then what might be the effect of a
strict application of the cost principle as between the competing.
Atlantic cities, say, for illustration, the cities of Baltimore and
ISew York. Baltimore is now a large and prosperous city; it is
the chief business centre of a territory larger than any one of the
States, and millions of people find their business favored, and
their prosperity and comforts enhanced by its existence. One-
of the most costly roads of the country, with extensive connec-
tions and feeders, has been created with almost exclusive regard
to Baltimore business; and the road will prosper if the city
prospers, and lose its importance if the city decays. A great
number of private individuals and public and private corpora-
tions are interested in the stock and indebtedness of this rail-
road company, and would be subjected to embarrassment or
suffering if it were to be forced into bankruptcy. For all these-
reasons the welfare of Baltimore is a matter of national import-
ance, and it is so connected with the trade of the interior that its














































































































































organized society. While it is not the province of government . 
to build up cities for its peopl e, it is its plain duty to permit the· 
cities the people build to live ; and it should so shape its own. 
action as to allow every town, as far as possible and reasonable, 
to avail itself of all its natural and acquired advantages in add-· 
ing to the prosperity, happiness and comfort of the local com­
munity. This seems too plai n  and indisputable a proposition to­
be contested by any official authority or public agency. 
In a certain sense railroad companies are public agencies, and 
· in some degree they exercise powers which are quasi govern­
mental. They make regulations for their business to which the 
general public are expected to conform ; and these regulations. 
are, in some respects, as important as the police laws established 
by the State itseli Among these are the regulations respecting 
charges for railroad service. According as these are heavy or · 
light upon the traffic of a particular locality, its trade is likel_y 
to decline or prosper, and so dependent is commerce upon rail-· 
roads that the growth of a town is likely to bear some propor­
tion to the extent of its railroad facilities, and the liberality with 
which it is treated by railroad managers. 
\Ve should consider then what might be the effect of a 
strict application of the cost principle as between the competing. 
Atlantic cities, say, for illustration, the cities of Baltimore and 
N ew York. Baltimore is now a large and prosperous city ; it is 
the chief business centre of a territory larger than any one of the· 
States, and millions of people find their business favored, and 
their prosperity and comforts enhanced by its existence. One­
of the most costly roads of the country, with extensive connec­
tions and feeders, has been created with almost exclusive regard 
to Baltimore busi ness ; and the road will prosper if the city 
prospers, and lose its importance if the city decays. A great. 
n u mber of private individuals and public and private corpora­
tions- are interested in the stock and indebtedness of this rail­
road company, and would be subjected to embarrassment or· 
suffering if it were to be forced into bankruptcy. For all these­
reasons the welfare of Baltimore is a matter of national import­
ance, and it is so connected with the trade of the interior that its 
existence modifies beneficially all the markets. But its relations. 
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to the foreign trade are also such as to render it important to the
whole civilized world.
But New York has some most decided advantages over Balti-
more, of which its people have availed themselves with great
ability and energy. The growth of that city has not been checked
by the marvelous prosperity of other towns, and its relative
superiority in both foreign and domestic commerce has been
substantially maintained. Though Baltimore is much nearer
the grain fields of the West, New York still draws to itself much
the larger share of the harvests, and it has done this in spite of
the fact that, with temporary and unimportant exceptions, the
differential rates have at all times been largely against that city.
Suppose now that under an application of the cost principle the
differentials could be abrogated ; what would be the effect upon
Baltimore ? Would it deprive that city of the share in the trade
of the country, which its location, its great expenditures and the
skill and enterprise of its people have hitherto secured for it?
Would it check the growth of the city, sap its prosperity, and
bring ruin upon those everywhere whose business arrangements
and investments have been made with a view exclusively or
mainly to the trade of that city ? And if so, would the result
be one that the country could contemplate with satisfaction as
the just result of the proper application of a sound principle, and
that those having influence in railroad affairs could justly and
properly plan for, labor for and shape their tariffs to accomplish ?
On the other hand, suppose the strict application of the cost
principle should be found to require that the differentials against
New York should be doubled; would it be admissible to double
them irrespective of all consequences to the trade and prosperity
of that city T That these consequences might prove disastrous
if the principle could be upheld and enforced, seems certain, for
it would give advantages to the town most favorably located for
cheap commercial intercourse for which the others could have
no compensation. But this very fact—if there were no other
impediment—would render the application of the principle im-
possible. A great city possesses great powers of self protection,
and it must exercise them to the fullest extent when the need














































































































































to the foreign trade are also such as to render it important to the 
whole civilized world. 
But New York has some most decided advantages over Balti­
more, of which its people have availed themselves with great 
ability and energy. The growth of that city bas not been checked 
by the marvelous prosperity of other towns, and its relative 
superiority in both foreign and domestic commerce has been 
substantia11y maintained. Though Baltimore is much nearer 
the grain fields of the West, New York Rtill draws to itself much 
the larger share of the harvests, and it has done this in spite of 
the fact that, with temporary and unimportant exceptions, the 
differential rates have at all times been largely against that city. 
Suppose now that under an application of the cost princi ple the 
differentials could be abrogated ; what would be the effect upon 
Balti more ? Would it depri ve that city of the share in the trade 
of the country, which its location, its great expenditures and· the 
skill and enterprise of its people have· hitherto secured for i t ? 
Would it check the growth of the city, sap its prosperity, and 
bring ruin upon those everywhere whose business arrangements 
and investments have been made with a view exclusively or 
mainly to the trade of that city ?  And if so, would the result 
be one that the country could contemplate with satisfaction as 
the just result of the proper application of a sound principle, and 
that those having influence in railroad affairs could j ustly and 
properly plan for, labor for and shape their tariffs to accom plish '( 
On the other hand, suppose the strict application of the cost 
principle should be found to require that the differentials against 
New York should be doubled ; would it be admissible to double 
them irrespective of all consequences to the trade and prosperity 
of that city 1' That these consequences might prove disastrous 
if the principle could be upheld and enforced, seems certain, for 
it would give advantages to the town most favorably located for­
cheap commercial intercourse for which the others could have 
no compensation. But this very fact-if there were no other­
impediment-would render the application of the principle im­
possible. A great city possesses great powers of self protection , 
and it must exercise them to the fullest extent when the need 
comes. Great railroad corporations cannot, in their rivalry with 
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each other, accept principles of action which must necessarily
impoverish them. If the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad would lose
its business under the application of the cost principle as between
it and the roads north of it, it must accept less returns upon its
business, and it must continue the struggle even though no more
than operating expenses be realized, rather than submit to de-
struction without an effort at self preservation. This or some-
thing like it must be the inevitable result; for neither cities nor
transportation companies can or will accept a principle which it
can be seen in advance must build up some on the ruin of the
others.
But when it comes to applying the cost principle to the
several lines which serve the same city, it is at once perceived
that the difficulties are insurmountable. The application must
of course be made on estimates of probable results, and the
estimates will have in view a percentage of profits which it is
expected or hoped will be realized. But with four or more lines
of very different length competing for the same business, it is
evident that cost must have, when applied to their business, very
different meanings. If the shortest and cheapest line makes its
charges on a calculation of say ten per cent profit, the longest
and most expensive must conform to the charges, even though
they be such as will insure no profit at all. One company may
then carry at a cost which includes ten per cent. profit, another
at a cost which includes say two per cent. profit, while a third
barely pays its operating expenses and repairs, but still obtains
the cost of moving the freight. Competition obliges the com-
panies to take what they can get, and to satisfy the demands up-
on them from it; but when the cost standard is so uncertain and
elastic that it may include profits when they can be earned, and
must exclude them when they cannot be, it is evident that it can-
not be a standard of general or just application. It is impossible
that anything can be a governing principle, which, in the nature
of things, cannot have the same meaning to the several parties
who are to be affected by its application.
That the cost to the roads themselves of moving their freights,
irrespective of profits to shareholders, has much to do in deter-














































































































































each other, accept principles of action which must necessarily 
impoverish them. If the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad would lose 
its business under the application of the cost principle as between 
it and the roads north of it, it must accept less returns upon its 
business, and it must conti nue the struggle even though no more 
than operati ng expenses be realized, rather than submit to de­
struction without an effort at self preservation. This or some­
thing l ike it m ust be the inevitable result ; for neither cities nor 
transportation companies can or will accept a principle which it 
can be seen in advance must build up some on the ruin of  the 
others. 
But when it comes to applying the cost principle to the 
several lines which serve the same city, it is at once perceived 
that the difficulties are insurmountable. The application must 
of course be made on estimates of probable results, and the 
estimates will  have in view a percentage of profits which it is 
expected or hoped will be realized. But with four or more lines 
of very different length competing for the sarne business, it is 
evident that cost must have, when applied to their business, very 
different meanings. If the shortest and cheapest line makes its 
charges on a calculation of say ten per cent. profit, the longest 
and most expensive must conform to the charges, even though 
they be such as will insure no profit at all. One company may 
then carry at a cost which includes ten per cent. profit, another 
at a cost which incl udes say two per cent profit, while a third 
barely pays its operating expenses and repairs, but still obtains 
the cost of moving the freight. Competition obliges the com­
panies to take what they can get, and to satisfy the demands up­
on them from it ; but when the cost standard is so uncertain and 
elastic that it may include profits when they can be earned, and 
m ust exclude them when they cannot be, it is evident that it can­
not be a standard of general or just application. It is impossible 
that anything can be a governing principle, which, in the natUre 
of thi ngs, cannot have the same meaning to the several parties 
who are to be affected by its application. 
. That the cost to the roads themselves of moving their freights, 
irrespective of profits to shareholders, has much to do in deter­
mining the charges is, we think, unquestionable. It certainly. 
must have influence so long as competition between lines exists,
for the most economical line may fix rates on a consideration of ,
what its favorable circumstances will enable it to endure, and
all others must accept them whether they prove satisfactory or
otherwise. One cheap line may thus give to a town the benefits
of cheap transportation, not as an application of the cost prin-
ciple, bat because its favorable circumstances enable it to do so
consistent with its own interests.
The idea was not put forward in any of the arguments that
the application of the cost principle could be made universal,
and that every railroad company should apply it in its own busi-
ness as between the different kinds and classes of freight. The
difficulty in doing this as a mere matter of accounting would be
very serious ; but there would be other difficulties which would
be more important to the general public. The chief of these
would be this : that very many articles would not bear transpor-
tation for the very considerable distances for which they are now
carried, if the charges upon them were graded strictly by the
cost. If their bulk or weight is large in proportion to their value,
they must be carried cheaply or they cannot be carried at all; and
freights are therefore classified in the tariffs so that the lighter,
but more valuable, articles are made to bear a burden out of pro-
portion to the cost of carriage, in order that the roads which
carry them may be enabled at the same time to serve the public
in the exchange of articles and products whose value will not
admit of like charges. Some discriminations of this sort are
essential to enable railroads to answer the expectations and meet
the needs of the public. It must often happen, also, that where
two or more roads are competing for a particular business, one
of them must carry what it gets of it without profit, and must
find its profit elsewhere. If the competition under such circum-
stances leads to the road carrying one kind of traffic at a loss,
which is made up by an increase of burdens on the remainder,
a wrong is done of which complaint may justly be made ; but
there is no inherent wrong to any one in a road conveying with-
out profit, but also without loss, a business which it must accept














































































































































must have influence so long as competition between lines exists, 
for the most economical line may fix rates on a consideration of · 
what its favorable circumstances will enable it to endure, and 
all others must accept them whether they prove satisfactory or 
otherwise. One cheap line may thus give to a town the benefits 
of cheap transportation, not as an application of the cost prin­
ciple, but because its favorable circumstances enable it to do so 
consistent with its own i nterests. 
The idea was not put forward in any of the arguments that 
the application of the cost principle could be made universal, 
and that every railroad company should apply it in its own busi­
ness as between the different kinds and classes of freight. The 
difficulty in doing this as a mere matter of accounting would be 
very serious ; but there would be other difficulties which would 
be more important to the general public. The chief of these 
would be this : that very many articles would not bear transpor­
tation for the very considerable distances for which they are now 
carried, if the charges upon them were graded strictly by the 
cost. If their bulk or weight is large in proportion to their value, 
they must be carried cheaply or they cannot be carried at al l ;  and 
freights are therefore classified in the tariffs so that the lighter, 
but more valuable, articles are made to bear a burden out of pro­
portion to the cost of carriage, in order that the roads which 
carry them may be enabled at the same time to serve the public 
in the exchange of articles and products whose value will not 
admit of like charges. S(lme discriminations of this sort are 
essential to enable rai lroads to answer the expectations and meet 
the needs of the public. It must often happen, also, that where 
two or more roads are competing for a particular business, one 
of them must carry what it gets of it w ithout profit, and must 
find its profit elsewhere. If the competition under such circum­
stances leads to the road carrying one kind of traffic at a loss, 
which is made up by an increase of burdens on the remainder, 
a wrong is done of which complaint may justly be made ; but 
there is no i nherent wrong to any one in a road conveying wi•h· 
out profit, but also without loss, a business which it  must accept 
on those terms or decline altogether. 
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THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPETITION.
If neither distance nor cost gives us the governing principle,
we must next see whether we are to find it in competition. In
nearly every other kind of business the competition of those
engaged in it is the great regulator of charges, and the opera-
tion of natural and familiar laws of trade prevents extortion
and brings about substantial uniformity. Will competition do
this in the business of transporting property by rail ? If so, is
not the competitive principle the true principle? And will not
the competitive principle make cost and distance elements in
the determination of rates, and allow to each its just value, ac-
cording to the circumstances ?
We should be glad to feel able to give to these questions an
unhesitating answer in the affirmative. We have found, how-
ever, in the course of our investigations, that a species of com-
petition has prevailed from time to time which has brought
satisfaction to few persons, if any, and which has resulted in
inequalities and disorders greatly detrimental to trade. Such
competition exists when the railroad companies, or those who
are permitted to solicit business and to make contracts on their
behalf, set out with the determination to withdraw freights from
their rivals, and secure them for themselves, at all hazards, and
regardless of gain or loss; and when acting upon this determi-
nation they throw to the winds all settled rates, and in the
desperate strife for business offer any inducement in their power
which will secure it. The country not long since had experi-
ence of such a season, and everywhere we listened to complaints
of the injury which legitimate business suffered from it It
was said by parties interested in transportation that the inaugu-
ration of such a strife put an end for the time to all possibility
of calculating from day to day what would be the cost of car-
riage, and what could be safely paid or wisely accepted for
gram, provisions, or other articles, destined to another market
by rail. The control of railroad rates, and, to a large extent,
of all railroad business, then passed out of the hands of the
legitimate and regular corporate managers into the hands of














































































































































THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPETITION. 
If n either distance nor cost gives us the governing principle, 
we must next see whether we are to find it in competition. In 
nearly every other kind of business the competition of those 
engaged in it is the great regulator of charges, and the opera· 
tion of natural and familiar laws of trade prevents extortion 
11.nd brings about substantial uniformity. Will competition do 
this in the business of transporting property by rail ? If so, is 
not the com petitive principle the true principle ? And will not 
the com petitive prin0iple make cost and distance elements in 
the determination of rates, and a1 low to each its j ust val ue, ac­
cording to the circumstances ? 
We· should be glad to feel able to give to these questions an 
unhesitating answer in the affirmative. We have found, how­
ever, in the course of our investigations, that a species of com­
petition has prevailed from ti me to time which has brought 
satisfaction to few persons, if any, and which has resulted in 
inequal ities and disorders greatly detrimental to trade. Such 
competition exists when the railroad companies, or those who 
are permitted to solicit business and to make contracts on their 
behalf, set out with the determination to withdraw freights from 
their rivals, and secure them for themselves, at al l hazards, and 
regardless of gain or losR ; and when acting upon this determi­
nation they throw to the winds all settled rates, and in the 
desperate strife for business offer ·any inducement in their power 
which will  secure it. The country not long since had experi­
ence of such a season, and everywh ere we li stened to complaints 
of the . injury which legitimate business suffered from it. It 
was said b_y parties interested in  transportation that the inaugu­
ration of such a strife put an end for the time to all possibil i ty 
of calculat i ng from day to day what would be the cost of car­
riage, and what could be safely paid or wisely accepted for 
grain,  provisions, or other articles, destined to another market 
by rai l. '!'be con trol of railroad rates, and, to a large extent, 
of all railroad business, then passed out of the hands of the 
legitimate and regular corporate managers into the hands of 
sol icitors for fast freight lines and other agenti., who made from 
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.day to day, and from hour to hour, such terms with those hav-
ing business as would secure it, but generally made secret
-terms—that the bargain with one man might not prevent their
driving a better bargain with another, as they might find oppor-
tunity. Under such circumstances persons were favored and
localities were favored, when the object to be immediately ac-
.complished seemed to require it—regardless of the just maxims
of legitimate business, and of the rules of the common law,
which enjoin upon common carriers that they shall deal with all
-customers upon principles of equity and relative fairness. Le-
gitimate business, it was said, necessarily passes into an un-
settled and speculative state while this condition of things ex-
ists ; safe and close calculations are impossible; transportation
becomes cheap, but neither producer nor consumer is certain to
reap the profit, for the middleman cannot calculate upon steadi-
ness in low rates, and as he takes the risk of their being raised
upon him, so he is in the best position to appropriate the benefit
while they continue. Meantime, railroad profits disappear, and
,dividends cease to be paid, to the great distress of thousands
who rely upon them for their living; and every interest, in any
degree dependent on railroad prosperity, must participate in
the depression and disaster which accompanies the ownership
.of railroad shares.
The mere statement of these results is sufficient to show that
this is not what in other business is known and designated
as competition. Competition is the life of trade, but this is its
destruction; competition brings health and vigor, and secures
equality and fairness, but this paralyzes strength, and makes
,contracts a matter of secrecy and double dealing. In competi-
tion, the sound dealer, operating upon his own capital and upon
•well established credit, has the best chance of success ; but in
the sort of competition we have mentioned, it is found that the
Tjankrupt corporation has the advantage, for its managers, hav-
ing nothing to lose, may offer rates which solvent roads cannot
meet without being dragged into bankruptcy with them. Kail-
road managers do not concede that this state of things is prop-
erly designated competition, but they speak of it as an unnat-














































































































































-day to day, and from hour to hour, such terms with those hav­
ing business as would secure it, but generally made secret 
-terms-that the bargain with one man might not prevent their 
driving a better bargain with another, as they might find oppor­
-tunity. Under such circumstances persons were favored and 
local ities were favored, when the object to be immediately ac­
·comp1 ished seemed to requi re it-regardless of the just maxi ms 
of legitimate business, and of the rules of the common law, 
which enjoin upon common carriers that they shall deal with all 
-customers upon principles of equity and relative fairness. Le-
-gitimate business, it was said , necessarily pa�ses into an un-
settled and speculative state while this condition of things ex­
ists ; safe and close calculations are impossible ; transportation 
becomes cheap, but neither producer nor consumer is certain to 
reap the profit, for the middleman cannot calculate upon steadi­
•ness in low rates, and as he takes the risk of their being raised 
upon him, so he is in the best position to appropriate the benefit 
while they continue. Meantime, railroad profits disappear, and 
·dividends cease to be paid, to the great distress of thousands 
who rely upon them for their living ; and every interest, in any 
degree dependent on railroad prosperity, must participate in 
the depression and disaster which accompanies the ownership 
-0f railroad shares. 
The mere statement of these results is sufficient to show that 
this is not what in other business is kno w n  and designated 
.as competition. Competition is the life of trade, but this is its 
destruction ; competition brings health and vigor, and secures 
equality and fairness, but this paralyzes strength, and makes 
· contracts a matter of secrecy and double dealing. In competi­
tion, the sound dealer, operating upon his own capital and upon 
well established credit, has the best chance of success ; but in 
the sort of competition we have mentioned, it is found that the 
oankrupt corporation has the advantage, for its managers, hav­
ing nothing to lose, may offer rates which solvent roads cannot 
meet without being dragged into bankruptcy with them. Rail­
road managers do not concede that this state of things is prop· 
�rly designated competition, but they speak of it as an unnat­
ural condition of railroad hosti lity ; as unreasoning railroad 
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warfare; as competitive strife, rather than competition. It is a
state of things that, like a war between nations, from its very
destructiveness, cannot be a normal condition, but must speedily
terminate in peace or in disaster. It has usually been termin-
ated by some common understanding between railroad mana-
gers upon a tariff of rates.
But this common understanding, it is urged, in some quarters,
eliminates competition from the sphere of railroad business, and
we escape the evils of competitive strife by embracing those of
monopoly. This is denied by railroad managers, who insist
that understandings respecting the reasonable management of
their business are not only entirely consistent with competition,
but that they are the only means whereby the excessive com-
petition at some points can be prevented from operating oppres-
sively at others. It is no doubt true that competition tends to
produce some great inequalities, and that care ought to be taken
to prevent this. It should never be forgotten that the trans-
portation of property and persons by railroad is not exclusively
a private business, but is carried on under franchises granted by
the State, which confer upon the owners functions of a .semi-
public nature, and charge them with certain public duties.
The railroad manager, operating under such a franchise, must
harmonize the interest of his road with the public duty, and he
cannot make self interest the exclusive guide, as a merchant
may, or a farmer. One of the chief of these public duties is to
make only reasonable charges, and to regulate and apportion
these among the customers of the road, on principles of equity
and relative equality. But the operation of competition is per-
petually in conflict with this duty; it is felt unequally along
railroad lines; it will be active at points where several lines can
compete; it will be moderate at others where there is little to
excite it, while at still others there can be no competition, be-
cause there is but a single road. But the capital of a railroad
company is planted on a certain line; it must be made available
to its owners there or nowhere; it cannot be removed when
found unprofitable, as a merchant may remove his stock of
goods; and the tendency of excessive competition is to cast














































































































































warfare ; as competitive strife, rather than competition. It is a 
state of things that, like a war between nations, from its very 
destructiveness, cannot be a normal condition, but  m ust speedily 
terminate in peace or in disaster. It has usually been termin­
ated by some common understanding between railroad mana­
gers upon a tariff of rates. 
But this common understanding, it is urged, in some quarterst 
eliminates competition from the sphere of railroad business, and 
we escape the evils of competitive strife by embracing those of 
monopoly. This is denied by railroad managers, who insist 
that understandings respecting the reasonable management of 
their business are not only entirely consistent with competitiont 
but that they are the only means whereby the excessive com­
petition at some points can be prevented from operating oppres­
sively at others. It is no doubt true that competition tends to 
prod uce some great inequalities, and that care ought to be taken 
to prevent this. It should never be forgotten that the trans­
portation of property and persons by railroad is not exclusively 
a private business, but is carried on under franchises granted by 
the State, which confer upon the owners functions of a .semi­
public nature, and charge them with certai n p ublic duties. 
The rai lroad manager, operating under such a franchise, must 
harmonize the interest of his road with the public duty, and be 
cannot make self interest the exclusive guide, as a merchant 
may, or a farmer. One of the chief of these public duties is to 
make only reasonable charges, and to regulate and apportion 
these among the customers of the road, on principles of equity 
and relative equality. But the operation of competition is per­
petually in conflict with this duty ; it is felt unequally along 
railroad lines ; it will be active at points where several lines can 
compete ; it will be moderate at others where there is little to 
excite it, while at stil l oth ers there can be no competition, be­
cause there is but a single road. But the capital of a railroad 
company is planted on a certain line ; it m ust be made available 
to its owners there or nowhere ; it cannot be removed when 
found unprofitable, as a merchant may remove his stock of 
goods ; and the tendency of excessive competition is to cast. 
upon the business of non-competing points a cost for transpor-
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tation which puts them to great relative disadvantage, and in
extreme cases may prove ruinous. The local traffic is likely to
experience this result most severely, and the more completely
any particular line occupies a territory, the more is the local
traffic exposed to peril. The New York Central Eailroad with
no connections west of Buffalo, would be a mere local road, and
must find remunerative returns upon all its immense invest-
ments from the local business; as a great through line, it is en-
abled to cast upon through traffic a part of the burden which
local traffic must otherwise bear; but if under the stress of un-
reasonable and excessive strife for through freights that class of
freights is carried at a loss, this loss must either fall upon the
corporate shareholders, or it must be cast by the corporation
upon the shippers of local freights. It must be assumed that
railroad boards will always seek to 'so arrange their tariffs of
rates as to secure a satisfactory net profit; and if a part of the
business pays too little, the remainder may be made to pay too
much. This is not a beneficial result of competition, or one
consistent with the obligations of the railroad companies to the
public. No one disputes or doubts that for the general public
the business of transportation by rail is in the most desirable
state when it is so conducted that the charges for moving prop-
erty are distributed with relative equality over all the business,
so that a moderate profit may be reaped from all, and the sup-
port of the road, and profits to its owners, not be exacted wholly
or mainly from one portion of the business to the exemption of
the remainder. But it is only when it is in that state that rail-
road companies are complying with their common law obliga-
tion as carriers. If they are sacrificing the interests of one class
of shippers in the reckless strife to obtain the business of an-
other. it is plain that they cannot be dealing impartially or
making charges which are relatively just And certainly no
city can be interested in having the trade which is nearest to it,
and which is the trade of the people constituting its best and
largest customers, sacrificed to the trade with the people at a
distance, who deal with it much less.
It is a fact of which the railroad companies are entitled to














































































































































tation which puts them to great relative disadvantage, and in 
extreme cases may prove ruinous. The local traffic is likely to 
experience this result most severely, and the more completely 
any particular line occupies a territory, the more is the local 
traffic exposed to peril. The New York Central Railroad with 
no connections west of Buffalo, would be a mere local road, and 
must find remunerative returns upon all its immense invest­
ments from the local business ; as a great through line, it is en­
abled to cast upon through traffic a part of the burden which 
local traffic must otherwise bear ; but if under the stress of un­
reasonable and excessive strife for through freights that class· of 
freights is carried at a loss, this loss must either fall upon the 
corporate shareholders, or it must be cast by the corporation 
upon the shippers of local freights. It must be assumed that 
railroad boards will always seek to ·so arrange their tariffs of 
rates as to secure a satisfactory net profit ; and if a part of the 
business pays too little, the remainder may be made to pay too 
much. This is not a beneficial result of competition, or one 
consistent with the obligations of the railroad companies to the 
public. No one disputes or doubts that for the general public 
the business of transportation by rail is in the most desirable 
state when it is so conducted that the charges for moving prop­
erty are distributed with relative equality over all the business, 
so that a moderate profit may be reaped from all, and the sup­
port of the road, and profits to its owners, not be exacted wholly 
or mainly from one portion of the business to the exemption of 
the remainder. But it is only when it is in that state that rail­
road companies are complying with their common law obliga­
tion as carriers. If they are sacrificing the interests of one class 
of shippers in the reckless strife to obtain the business of an­
other, it is plain that they cannot be dealing impartially or 
making charges which are relatively just. And certainly no 
city can be interested in havi ng the trade which is nearest to it, 
and which is the trade of the people constituting its best and 
largest customers, sacrificed to the trade with the people at a 
distance, who deal with it much less. 
It is a fact of which the railroad cumpanies are entitled tc, 
the full benefit, that the charges for railroad service have · 
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steadily declined, even when the railroads have been so con-
ducted as to avoid competitive strife. Mr. Poor, in his sum-
mary of railroad operations for the year 1881, prepared for his
Manual, gives some striking figures on the subject of rates,
and shows that within a quarter of a century, the average
charges for the transportation of property on three of the
great railroad lines of the country have been reduced more
than seventy per cent., and that the reduction has continued
to go on until the present day.* Some of the reasons for
the reduction are traceable to competition and some not. The
growth of railroad business has kept pace with the reduction
of the charges upon transportation, and the two have acted
and reacted upon each other as cause and effect. When the
merchandise or products of one section of the country, for
which there was a demand in another, would not bear trans-
portation at existing rates, the railroads have been compelled
to reduce the rates as a necessary condition to obtaining the
property for carriage ; and the reductions which are made in
* " The internal commerce of the country, in all its vast magnitude, is a direct
creation of our railroads, through the reduction they have effected in the
cost of transportation. A good example of their method, and of its results, is
afforded by the operations of the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad.
In 1856, immediately after its consolidation, this road moved 670,073 tons ot
freight at a charge of $3,758,320, and at a cost of $1,539,912 ; the net being
$2,215,408. The tons moved one mile equalled 114,827,793; the charge was
3.270 cents ; the cost, 1.341 cents ; the net, 1.929 cents per ton per mile.
"In 1881 the same road moved 11,591,379 tons of freight at a charge of
$20,736,750, and at a cost of $14,913,213 ; the net being $5,823,537. The number
of tons moved one mile equalled 2,646,814,098; the charge was .780 cents; the
cost, .562 cents; the net, .218 cents per ton per mile.
"At the rate of 1855, the charge for moving a ton of wheat from Chicago to
New York, a distance of 960 miles, was $31.39; in 1881, $7.51. The actual
charge for the latter year for this kind. of freight did not probably exceed $4 the
ton—the charge for freight in bulk on the long haul being much below the gen-
eral average. It is certain that each year the railroad charged the freight traffic
over it all it would bear. It had to meet a most vigorous competition from every
quarter. It had to meet the exigency of the farmers of the extreme West, so
that the wheat grower, first on the Mississippi River and then on the Missouri,
nearly 2,000 miles in the interior, could send, at remunerative rates, his produce
to market, foreign as well as domestic. Charges for transportation had to be, as
they always must be, in inverse ratio to distance, or a limit would soon be reached














































































































































steadily declined, even when the railroads have been so con­
ducted as to avoid competitive strife. Mr. Poor, in his sum­
mary of railroad operations for the year 1881, prepared for his 
Manual, gives some striking figures on the subject of rates, 
and shows that within a quarter of a century, the average 
charges for the transportation of property on three of the 
great railroad lines of the country have been reduced more 
than seventy per cent. , and that the reduction has continued 
to go on until the present day.* Some of the reasons for 
the reduction are traceable to competition and some not. The 
growth of railroad business has kept pace with the reduction 
of the charges upon transportation, and the two have acted 
and reacted upon each other as cause and effect. When the 
merchandise or products of one section of the country, for 
which there was a demand in another, would not bear trans­
portation at existing rates, the railroads have been compelled 
to reduce the rates as a necessary condition to obtaining the 
property for carriage ; and the reductions which are made in 
----- . ·- - ·---· . ·-- ··-· ·---------------
* 1 1  The internal commerce of the country, in all its vast magnitude, is a direct 
creation of our railroads, through the reduction they have effected in the 
cost of transportation. A good example of thefr method, and of its results, is 
·afforded by the operations of the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad. 
In 1 855, immediately after its consolidation, this road moved 670,073 tons of 
freight at a charge of $3, 758, 32 0, and at a cost of $1 , 539,91 2 ; the net being 
$2,215,408. The tons moved one mile equalled 1 14,82 7,793 ; the charge was 
3.270 cents ; the cost, 1.341 cents ; the net, 1 .9 2 9  cents per ton per mile. 
" In 1 8 8 1  the same road moved 1 1 ,591 ,379 tons of freight at a charge of 
$20, 736, 7 50, and at a cost of $14,913,j? I B ; the net being $5, 823,537.  The number 
of tons moved one mile equalled 2,646,814,098 ; the charge was . 780 cents ; the 
cost, .562 cents ; the net, . 2 1 8  cents per ton per mile. 
11 At the rate of 1855, the charge for moving a ton of wheat from Chicago to 
New York, a distance of 960 miles, was $31 . 39 ; in 188 1 ,  $7.51.  The actual 
charge for the latter year for this kind. of freight did not probably exceed $4 the 
ton-the charge for freight h1 bulk on the long haul being m uch below the gen­
eral average. It if'I certain that each year the railroad charged the freight traffic 
over it all it would bear. It had to meet a most vigorous competition from every 
quarter. It had to meet the exigency of the farmers of the extreme West, ao 
that the wheat grower, first on the Mississippi River and then on the Missouri, 
nearly 2,000 miles in the interior, could send, at remunerative rates, his produce 
to market, foreign as well as domestic. Charges !or transportation had to be, as 
they always must be, in inverse ratio to distance, or a limit would soon be reached 
beyond which freight, from excessive cost, could not be moved. It ia with rail-
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some cases from necessity are made in others from policy,
because it is found that they stimulate industry, build up
manufactures, and bring profits to the railroad companies in
the great increase of business which is thereby prepared for
them. In all these cases the common interest of railroad
companies requires that they should yield to any public de-
mand for the reduction of rates so long and so rapidly as they
find they can do so with justice to their shareholders; and
they have generally found that the net results were such as
from a selfish standpoint would fully justify the reductions.
Common understandings between railroad companies.in many
such cases might tend to equalize and steady the rates, but
would be grossly impolitic and unreasonable if they were
directed to the maintenance of such freight charges as would
operate as a check upon transportation, and thereby reduce
their own net revenues.
But there are influences bearing upon the charges for the
transportation of property which are beyond the reach of the
railroad companies altogether, and which no combination
roads as with all other kinds of business, the charges and prices must be so gradu-
ated as to allow a profit on both sides, and they will always be so graduated.
Charges have been reduced to rates that were believed to be impossible a few
years ago. In 1872 it cost the New York Central 1.129 cents to move a ton of
freight one mile. In 1881 it received only .783 cents for a similar service, or
.346 cents less than the cost ten years before. Such is the history of railroad
transportation, and such the methods by which the enormous tonnage, and with
it the internal commerce of the country, now so colossal in its proportions, has
been created. In its reduction of charges the Central Railroad only represents
the entire system of the country. The New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad,
in 1855, moved 842,055 tons of freight at a charge of 2.424 cents, and at a cost of
1.155 cents per ton per mile. In 1881 it moved 11,086,823 tons at a charge of
.805 cents, and at a cost of .529 cents per ton per mile. Had it charged as much
per mile in 1881 as it did in 1855, its receipts from freight would have been $47,-
101,811, in place of $5,473,313, the amount actually received. The Pennsylvania
Railroad moved, in 1855, 365,006 tons of freight at a charge of 2.746 cents, and
at a cost of 1.662 cents per ton per mile. In 1881 it moved 18,229,365 tons at a
charge of .799 cents, and at a cost of .437 cents per ton per mile. Had it charged
the same rates in 1881 that it did in 1855, its receipts for the past year would
have been $73,195,832, in place of $10,801,089, the amount actually received.
The charge in 1881 was .87 cents less than the cost of movement in 1872. The
result of reduced charges is seen in the enormous increase of freight and of in-














































































































































some cases from necessity are made in others from policy, 
because it is found that they stimulate industry, build up 
manufactures, and bring profits to the railroad companies in 
the great increase of business which is thereby prepared for 
them. In all these cases the common interest of railroad 
companies requires that they should yield to any public de­
mand for the reduction of rates so. Jong and so rapidly as they 
find they can do so with justice to their shareholders ; and 
they have generally found that the net results were such as 
from a selfish standpoint would fully justify the reductions. 
Common understandings between railroad companies .in many 
such cases might tend to equalize and steady the rates, but 
would be grossly impolitic and unreasonable if they were 
directed to the maintenance of such freight charges as would 
operate as a check upon transportation, and thereby reduce 
their own net revenues. 
But there are influences bearing upon the charges for the 
transportation of property which are beyond the reach of the 
railroad companies altogether, and which no combination 
roads as with all other kinds of business, the charges and prices must be so gradu­
ated as to allow a profit on both sides, and they will always be so graduated. 
Charges have been reduced to rates that were believed to be impossible a few 
years ago. In 1 8 7 2  iL cost the New York Central 1 . 129  cents to move a ton of 
freight one mile. In 1 8 8 1  it reoeived only . 783 cents for a similar service, or 
,346 cents leas than the cost ten years before. Such is the history of railroad 
transportation, and such the methods by which the enormous tonnage, and with 
it the internal commerce of the country, now so colossal in its proportions, has 
been created. In its reduction of charges the Central Railroad only represents 
the entire system of the country. The New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad, 
in 1855, moved 842,055 tons of freight at a charge of 2.424 cents, and at a cost of 
1 . 1 55 cents per ton per mile. In 1881  it moved l l ,086,823 tons at a charge of 
.805 cents, and at a cost of .529 cents per ton per mile. Had it charged as much 
per mile in 1881 as it did in 1855,  its receipts from freight would have been $47,-
101,8 1 1 ,  in place of $5,47 3,31 3, the amount actually received. The Pennsylvania 
Railroad moved, in 1 855, 365,006 tons of freight at a charge of 2.746 cents, and 
at a cost of 1 . 662 cents per ton per mile. In 1 8 8 1  it moved 1 8,2 29, 365 tons at a · 
charge of . 799 cents, and at a cost of .437 cents per ton per mile. Had it charged 
the same rates in 1 88 1  that it did in 1855, its receipts for the past year would 
have been $73, 1 95,832, in pllice of $10,801 ,089, the amount actually received. 
The charge in 1881  waR .87 cents less than the cost of movement in 1 87 2. The 
result of reduced charges is seen in the enormous increase of freight and or in­
come-quantity making up for reduced rate of profits."  
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among them can control. The transportation of the products
and merchandise which the different sections of the country
exchange with each other is only in part in railroad hands,
and the carriers by rail are at all times subjected to a com-
petition which is not only active and vigilant, but is possessed
of some most important advantages. It will readily be in-
ferred that we allude here to the carriers by water. For the
whole distance from Chicago to New York the owners of
boats on lake and canal are bidding against the railroads for
freights. Much of the time they are offering rates which the
railroads -cannot meet without loss, and during the season of
water carriage they would take away from the railroads nearly
all the heavy freights, if it were not that the more rapid
transit by rail has some advantages of which shippers find
it for their interest in many cases to avail themselves. But
even with these advantages the railroads find themselves
compelled to make their charges approximate the charges of
carriage by water, or the great bulk of heavy freights will
inevitably take the water route. Thus the competition by
water operates in reduction of railroad tariffs, and no under-
standing among railroad managers can prevent it. When the
Erie canal is closed for the winter the railroad companies are
enabled to advance their charges ; but even in the winter
they feel the competition of the water route ; for excessive
charges will not be paid, but grain, flour, provisions and
other heavy articles, instead of going forward by rail at what
seem to shippers extortionate rates, will be placed in store
until the water route is again open. Nor is the competition
with the water route felt exclusively by the roads to New
York; for unless the seaports to the south afford better mar-
kets for western products than is found at New York, which
they seldom or never do, the roads leading to them will be
cut off from carrying these products if their charges are
made to exceed the charges to New York. The favorable in-
fluence of the water route upon rates is therefore felt all the
way to the Ohio and the Potomac, and the maximum of rates
is fixed for all the roads by the roads to New York, with















































































































































among them can control. The transportation of the products 
and merchandise which the different sections of the country 
exchange with each other is only in part in railroad hands, 
and the carriers by rail are at all times subjected to a com­
petition which is not only active and vigilant, but is possessed 
of some most important advantages. It will readily be in­
ferred that we allude here to the carriers by water. For the 
whole distance from Chicago to New York the owners of 
boats on lake and canal are bidding against the railroads for 
freights. Much of the time they are offering rates which the 
railroads ·cannot meet without loss, and during the season of 
water carriage they would take away from the railroads nearly 
all the heavy freights, if it were not that the more rapid 
transit by rail has some advantages of which shippers find 
it for their interest in many cases to avail themselves. But 
even with these advantages the railroads find themselves 
compelled to make their charges approximate the charges of 
carriage by water, or the great bulk of heavy freights will 
inevitably take the water route. Thus the competition by 
water operates in reduction of railroad tariffs, and no under­
standing among railroad managers can prevent it. When the 
Erie canal is closed for the winter the railroad companies are 
enabled to advance their charges ; but even in the w inter 
they feel the competition of the water route ; for excessive 
charges will not be paid, but grain, flour, provisions and 
other heavy arti6les, instead of going forward by rail at what 
seem to shippers extortionate rates, will be placed in store 
until the water route is again open. Nor is the competition 
with the water route felt exclusively by the roads to New 
York ; for unless the seaports to the south afford better mar­
kets for western products than is found at New York, which 
they seldom or never do, the roads leading to them will be 
cut off from carrying these products if their charges are 
inade to exceed the charges to New York. The favorable in­
fluence of the water route upon rates is therefore felt all the 
way to the Ohio and the Potomac, and the maximum of rates 
is fixed for all the roads by the roads to New York, with 
which the water route comes most directly and immediately 
into competition. 
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Under the competitive principle, a maximum of rates is
thus established, and the railroad companies cannot prevent
it, whatever may be their desire. But distance, cost, and
many other circumstances may then come in to force still
lower rates on the lines to the cities south of New York. If
it is found that the roads leading to Baltimore will not obtain
a reasonable share in the business without offering better
rates than are given to New York, such rates will certainly be
offered. They will submit to the rates which give the busi-
ness to other cities only until the trial proves the prejudicial
operation. And when they reduce their charges, it will be
optional to the New York roads to follow the Baltimore lead,
and they may no doubt be relied upon to do so if their inter-
ests appear to require it.
But another most important factor in regulating freight
charges is the export trade.
The prices of the leading American products, in the car-
riage of which the railroads compete most actively, are fixed
in European markets. These products should net to the pro-
ducer in the American market the foreign price, less reason-
able charges for transportation and handling; and he is in-
terested in having the trade open to the competition of as
many buyers, and the transportation to that of as many car-
riers as possible. Of the Atlantic cities which compete for
this trade Baltimore and Philadelphia are nearest to the pro-
ducer, but New York and Boston are nearest to the foreign
market. Much is shipped to each of these cities for home
consumption, but the major part of all that they receive is
destined to a foreign market. Some of it passes from Western
towns on through bills of lading to foreign ports, but the
most of it is consigned to the merchants of the Atlantic cities,
and is reshipped by them. Except at Boston, it has been
found impracticable to distinguish between that intended for
home consumption and that for foreign shipment; and, there-
fore, no discrimination in freight charges is attempted, but
all is charged as if destined to a foreign market. But when
so treated, the Atlantic cities become merely so many points














































































































































Under the competitive principle, a maximum of rates is 
thus established, and the railroad companies cannot prevent 
it, whatever may be their desire. But distance, cost, and 
many other circumstances may then come in to force still 
lower rates on the lines to the cities south of New York. If 
it is found that the roads leading to Baltimore will not obtain 
a reasonable share in the business without offering better 
rates than are given to New York, such rates will certainly be 
offered. They will submit to the rates which give the busi­
ness to other cities only until the trial proves the prejudicial 
operation. And when they reduce their charges, it will be 
optional' to the New York roads to follow the Baltimore lead, 
and they may no doubt be relied upon to do so if their inter­
ests appear to require it. 
But anothe1· most important factor in regulating freight 
charges is the export trade. 
The prices of the leading American products, in the car­
riage of which the railroads compete most actively, are fixed 
in European markets. These products should net to the pro­
ducer in the American market the foreign price, less reason­
able charges for transportation and handling ; and he is in­
terested in having the trade open to the competition of as 
many buyers, and the transportation to that of as many car­
riers as possible. Of the Atlantic cities which compete for 
this trade Baltimore and Philadelpliia are nearest to the pro­
ducer, but New York and Boston are nearest to the foreign 
market. Much is shipped to each of these cities for home 
consumption, but the major part of all that they receive is 
destined to a foreign market. Some of it passes from Western 
towns on through bills of lading to foreign ports, but the 
most of it 'is consigned to the merchants of the Atlantic cities, 
and is reshipped by them. Except at Boston, it has been 
found impracticable to distinguish between that intended for 
home consumption and that for foreign shipment; and, there­
fore, no discrimination in freight charges is attempted, but 
all is charged as if destined to a foreign market. But when 
so treated, the Atlantic cities become merely so many points 
on so many through routes between the interior of the country 
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arid the European ports, arid the charges on shipments must
regard the whole lines and not parts of them merely. On
these several through lines, competing for the same business
between the same interior American towns and the foreign
ports, the whole charges, if the routes are equally favorable,
must be substantially the same, or the one giving the best
rates would obtain the business. The question of ocean rates
must, therefore, have an important bearing on the inland
rates ; for if the ocean rates are greater from Baltimore to
foreign ports than from New York to the same ports, the in-
land rates to Baltimore must necessarily be lower, or Balti-
more will be excluded from the trade. Turning our attention,
then, to the ocean freights, we find that during the year 1881,
from Baltimore to Liverpool by steam and sail, they averaged
nearly three cents per hundred pounds greater than from
New York, and from Philadelphia nearly two cents greater.
This is not conclusive of what they might be in another year,
but it is indicative of a general condition of things. Besides
this advantage in the ocean freights the New York route has
a further advantage in the somewhat greater expedition. If,
therefore, the railroads to Baltimore and Philadelphia were
to charge for the inland carriage the same that is charged to
New York, they must do so with the certain result of losing
their present participation in the export trade. They must,
therefore, of necessity, make their average inland rates at least
as much lower than the inland rates to New York as will
offset the differences in the ocean freights. This follows
under the sway of competition from the same necessity
which forces upon two merchants trading side by side
in the same articles a concurrence in the same prices.
Attempts by agreement or otherwise to counteract this law of
competition would be of little avail, and of no avail whatever
for any great length of time. All the leading articles of east-
ern bound freight would be affected by this principle, and
this would be so large a proportion of the whole as to govern
the charges on all.
The differentials then appear to us to find their reason in














































































































































and the European ports, and the charges on shipments must 
regard the whole lines and not parts of them merely. On 
these several through lines, competing for the same business 
between the same interior American towns and the foreign 
ports, the whole charges, if the routes are equally favorable, 
must be substantially the same, or the one giving the best 
rates would obtain the business. The question of ocean rates 
must, therefore, have an important bearing on the inland 
rates ; for if the ocean rates are greater from Baltimore to 
foreign ports than from New Y Ol'k to the same ports, the in­
land 1·ates to Baltimore must necessarily be lower, or Balti­
more will be excluded from the trade. Turning our attention, 
then, to the ocean freights, we find that during the year 1881, 
from Baltimore to Liverpool by steam and sail, they averaged 
nearly th1·ee cents per hundred pounds greater than from 
New York, and from Philadelphia nearly two cents greater. 
This is not conclusive of what they might be in another year, 
but it is indicative of a general condition of things. Besides 
this advantage in the ocean freights the New York route has 
a further advantage in the somewhat greater expedition. If, 
therefore, the 1·ailroads to Baltimore and Philadelphia were 
to charge for the inland carriage the same that is charged to 
New York, they must do so with the certain result of losing 
their present participation in tb e export trade. They must, 
therefore, of necessity, make their average inland rates at least 
as much lower than the inland rates to New York as will 
offset the differences in the ocean freights. This follows 
under the sway of competition from the same necessity 
which fo1·ces upon two merchants trading side by side 
in the same articles a concurrence in the same prices. 
Attempts by agreement or othe1·wise to counteract this law of 
competiti on would be of little avail, and of no avail whatever 
for any great length of time. All the leading articles of east­
ern bound freight would be .affected by this principle, and 
this would be so large a proportion of the whole as to govern 
the charges on all. 
The differentials then appear to us to find their reason in 
competitive fOl'ces. A brief i·eference to their history will 
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show that compact has not succeeded in controlling them.
In 1869 there was an agreed difference in favor of Baltimore
in the rates for the transportation of grain, of ten cents per
hundred pounds. But the effort to sustain this difference led
to a war of rates, as a result of which it was reduced one
half. This lesser difference was maintained until 1876, when
an agreement was entered into by the Trunk Line roads which
based the rates on relative distances. But at the end of a
month and a half the New York roads withdrew from this
agreement, being satisfied that its operation was prejudicial
to their interests. Then followed another war of rates, end-
ing after a long struggle in the differentials now existing.
The war of rates of 1880 was entered into to get rid of them,
but it proved ineffectual, as before stated. They appear,
therefore, to abide the tests of competition, and they have
come, as prices generally do, under the exigencies of trade.
But it is, of course, possible that differentials may be just
at one time and . unjust at another ; and it is insisted on be-
half of New York that, whatever may have been the case
heretofore, the existing differentials are no longer just to that
city, and are no longer such as would result from a competi-
tion not hampered and restrained by railroad combinations.
For evidence of the injustice, we are referred to statistics,
which show that the growth of Baltimore and Philadelphia
trade, especially in grain and provisions, has in late years
gained rapidly on that of New York. This, it is said, is proof
that the differentials operate against New York interests, and
the New York roads ought to abolish them by reducing their
own rates until they conform to the rates on the lines leading
to Baltimore and Philadelphia. This, it is insisted, is what
fair^competition requires.
It might, perhaps, be a sufficient answer to this demand,
thatJ the attempts heretofore made to force equality of
charges, though long persisted in, with no small loss to the
participants, proved unavailing. But passing that fact with-
out further remark, we direct our attention to the evidences
that New York has suffered from the differentials. These we














































































































































show that compact has not succeeded in controlling them. 
In 1869 there was an agreed difference in favor of Baltimore 
in the rates for the transportation of grain, of ten cents per 
hundred pounds. But the effort to sustain this diffe1·ence led 
to a war of rates, as a result of which it was reduced one 
half. This lesser difference was maintained until 1876, when 
an agreement was entered into by the Trunk Line roads which 
based the rates on relative distances. But at the end of a 
month and a half the New York roads withdrew from this 
agreement, being satisfied tha� its operation was prejudicial 
to their interests. Then followed another war of rates, end­
ing after a long struggle in the differentials now existing. 
The war of rates of 1880 was entered into to get rid of them, 
but it proved ineflectual, as before stated. They appear, 
therefore, to abide the tests of competition, and they have 
come, as prices generally do, under the exigencies of trade. 
But it is, of course, possible that differentials may be just 
at one time and . unjust at another ; and it is insisted on be­
half of New York that, whatever may have been the case 
heretofore, the existing differentials are no longer just to that 
city, and are no longer such as would result from a competi­
tfon not hampered and restrained by railroad combinations. 
For evidence of the injustice, we are referred to statistics, 
which show that the growth of Baltimore and Philadelphia 
trade, especially in grain and provi�ions, has in late years 
gained rapidly on that of New York. This, it is said, is proof 
that the differentials operate against New York interests, and 
the New York roads ought to abolish them by reducing their 
own rates until they conform to the rates on the lines leading 
to Baltimore and Philadelphia. This, it is insisted, is what 
fai(competition requires. 
It might, perhaps, be a sufficient answer to this demand, 
that}the attempts heretofore made to force equality of 
charges, though long persisted in, with no small loss to the 
participants, proved unavailing. But passing that faot with­
out further remark, we direct our attention to the evidences 
that New York has suffered from the differentials. These we 
have not found of much weight. It is certainly true that 
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Baltimore and Philadelphia have now a larger share in the
grain and provision traffic than they had fifteen years ago;
but it remains to connect the fact with the existence of the
differentials. For a long time New York nearly monopolized
that trade ; but the reasons were obvious in its better chan-
nels of communication with the interior, and its greater prep-
arations to accommodate it. When Baltimore and Philadel-
phia had extended their railroad systems, so as to compete
for the trade, and had provided elevators and other conve-
niences, they immediately took a share in the business; not
because of the differentials, but because they were then pre-
pared for it. But no evidences were produced before vis that
the Philadelphia and Baltimore business, to which the differ-
entials are applicable, is now increasing more rapidly in pro-
portion than that of New York, or that the growth of New York
business is to any extent checked by them. On the contrary,
there is abundant evidence that New York is fully maintaining
its present lead, and that its trade is enjoying a growth so
healthy and vigorous, that its commercial classes can well
afford to regard, without envy or regret, the prosperity of
other places, and may well concede to them, without repin-
ing, all the advantages which have come to them as a result
of competitive efforts. The accompanjdng note will show the
relative proportion of the total receipts of grain and flour at
the four Atlantic ports which was received at each, and it
will appear from the figures, that New York, during the last
eighteen months, has gained on the others.* How far
ephemeral causes have contributed to this gain we cannot
know, but it is manifest that the evidence that New-York
suffers from the differentials does not yet appear.
As the interior is interested in the subject of differential











































































































































































Baltimore and Philadelphia have now a larger share in the 
grain and provision traffic than they had fifteen years ago ; 
but it i·emains to connect the fact with the existence of the 
differentials. For a long time New York nearly monopolized 
that trade; but the reasons were obvious in its better chan­
nels of communication with the interior, and its greater prep­
arations to accommodate it. When Baltimore and Philadel­
phia had extended their railroad systems, so as to compete 
for the trade, and had provided elevators and other conve­
niences, they immediately took a share in the business ; not 
because of the differentials, but because they were then pre­
pared for it. But no evidences were produced before us that 
the Philadelphia and Baltimore business, to which the differ­
entials are applicable, is now increasing more rapidly in pro­
portion than that of New York, or. that the growth of New York 
business is to any extent checked by them. On the contrary, 
there is abundant evidence that New York is fully maintaining 
its present lead, and that its trade is enjoying a growth so 
healthy and vigorous, that its commercial classes can well 
afford to regard, without envy or regret, the prosperity of 
other places, and may well concede to them, without repin­
ing, all the advantages which have come to them as a result 
of competitive efforts. The accompanying note will show the 
relative proportion of the total receipts of grain and flour at 
the four Atlantic ports. which was received at each, and it 
will appear from the :figures, that New York, during the last 
eighteen months, has gained on the others.* How far 
ephemeral causes have contributed to this gain we cannot 
know, but it is manifest that the evidence that New ·York 
suffers from the differentials does not yet appear. 
As the interior is interested in the subject of differential 
rates, and as the sharpest competition in freights is en.conn-
1878. 1879. 188(1. 1881. 6 mo. 1882. 
*New York . . . . . . . . . . • . . . .  56. 5 2 . 6  53.5 56. 5 62.9 
Boston . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . • • . .  1 0 . 1 0 . 6 1 1 . 7 14.3 1 6. 8  
Philadelphia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 6. 7 1 5 . 3  1 5. 6  1 1 .7  1 1 .6 
Baltimore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 7 . 3  2 1 . 5  1 9 . 2  1 7 . 5  8 . 7  
100. 1 00. 1 0 0. 1 00.  1 00. 
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tered there, so that its commercial classes are in favorable
position to judge of the forces affecting them, it has seemed
to us no weak evidence of the justice and necessity of the
differentials that the preponderating sentiment in the interior
was strong and decided that the differentials were just.
There was, indeed, some dissent, but this was the prevailing
view.
In our discussion thus far, we have had but little to say of
the case of Boston, or of the westward bound freights. As to
the latter, some of the considerations above mentioned would
not apply, but the differences are not sufficient, as we think,
to relieve New York westward bound freights from the dif-
ferentials. We were not invited by the commercial organiza-
tions of Boston to visit that city, and we refrained for that
reason from doing so. We have reason to suppose that the
seeming want of interest in Boston in the subject referred to
us was due to the fact, that no one seemed .disposed to make
any controversy in respect to the rates to that city. Boston
claims the same rates with New York on the export trade,
and the other cities do not appear inclined to contest the
claim. This makes the charges less on foreign bound freights
than upon those delivered in Boston and other New England
towns for home consumption; and to that extent works an
apparent injustice. If the low charges on foreign bound
goods have the;;e£fect to increase the charges on freights for
home consumption, it is an injustice in fact; but if not, and
the Boston roads consent to carry at the low rates as a neces-
sary condition to participation in the foreign trade, the other
cities cannot well contest their right to do so. As the ocean
freights from Boston correspond very closely to those from
New York, the principle already stated is applicable ; and we
have no occasion to consider the case of Boston separately.
X
^ CONCLUSION.
It only remains for us to state that no evidence has been
offered before us that the existing differentials are unjust, or
that they operate to the prejudice of either of. the Atlantic sea-














































































































































tered there, so that its commercial classes are in favorable 
position to judge of the forces affecting them, it has seemed 
to us no weak evidence of the justice and necessity of the 
differentials that the preponderating sentiment in the interior 
was strong and decided that the differentials were just. 
There was, indeed, some dissent, but this was the prevailing 
VIeW. 
In our discussion thus far, we have had but little to say of 
the case of Boston, or of the westward bound freights. As to 
the latter, some of the considerations above mentioned would 
not apply, but the differences are not sufficient, as we think, 
to relieve New York westward bound freights from the dif­
ferentials. We were not invited by the commercial organiza­
tions of Boston to visit that city, and we refrained for that 
reason from doing so. We have reason to , suppose that the 
seeming want of interest in Boston in the subject referred to 
us was due to the fact, that no one seemed , disposed to make 
any controversy in respect to the rates to .that city. Boston 
claims the same rates with New York on the export trade, 
and the other cities do not appear inclined to contest the 
claim. This makes the charges less on foreign bound freights 
than upon those delivered in Boston and ot4er New England 
towns for home consumption ; and to that extent works an 
apparent injustice. If the low charges on foreign bound 
goods have tiu,,,.�ffect to increase the charges . on freights for 
home consumption, it is an injustice in fact ; but if not, and 
the Boston roads consent to carry at the low rates as a neces­
sary condition to participation in the foreign trade, the other 
cities cannot well contest their right to do so. As the ocean 
freights from Boston correspond very closely to those from 
New York, the principle already stated is applicable ; and we 
have no occasion to consider the case of Boston separately. 
-.\ . CONCLUSION. 
It only remains for us to state that no evidence has been 
offered before us that the existing differentials are unjust, or 
that they operate to the prejudice of either of. the Atlantic sea­
port cities. Differential rates have come into existence under 
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the operation of competitive forces ; they bear some relation to
relative distance and relative cost of service; they recognize as
we think the relative advantages of the several seaports; and
they are subordinate to the great principle which compels the
carriers of property competing between the same points and
offering equal facilities to their customers, to make the same
rates. We therefore cannot advise their being disturbed.
But we do not assume that the rates which are just to-day
will be just indefinitely. They have become established by the
force of circumstances, and they ought to give way if future
circumstances shall be such as to render it right and proper.
They constitute a temporary arrangement only; equitable, as
we think, for the present, but which may become inequitable
before the lapse of any considerable time. Whenever they shall
be found to operate unfairly, and to give a forced or unnatural
direction to trade, and whenever it shall appear that they tend
to deprive any one of the seaports affected by them of the pro-
portion of business that would naturally come to it under the
operation of normal competition, the want of equity in the rates
will appear, and it will be right to modify, or, perhaps, abolish
them.
Railroad problems assume such different phases from year to
year, and almost from day to day, that those who have authority
in railroad matters may justly be expected and required to give
their earnest attention and best efforts to making their franchises
accomplish the great ends of equal, fair, prompt and beneficial
accommodation which was intended in their grant. And those
ends they should have in view in determining upon the con-
tinued existence of differential rates. Their observation of the
general course of traffic from day to day and from month to
month ought to enable them to determine whether the differen-
tials are too large or too small; whether they are influencing
trade unfairly and unnaturally; and whether they operate as an
improper restraint upon competition; and when the improper
effect is discovered, they ought to correct the wrong without
hesitation or delay. To enable them to judge fairly and with
full understanding, accurate statistics of their business should














































































































































the operation of competitive forces ; they bear some relation to 
relative distance and relative cost of service ; they recognize · as 
we think the relative advantages of the several seaports ; and 
they are subordinate to the great principle which compels the 
carriers of property competing between the same points and 
offering equal facilities to their customers, to make the same 
rates. We therefore cannot advise their being disturbed. 
But we do not assume that the rates which are j ust to-day 
will be just indefinitely. They have become established by the 
force of circumstances, and they ought to give way if future 
circumstances shall be such as to render it right and proper. 
They constitute a temporary arrangement only ; equitable, as 
we think, for the present, but which may become inequitable 
before the lapse of any considerable time. Whenever they shall 
be found to operate unfairly, and to give a forced or unnatural 
direction to trade, and whenever it shall appear that they tend 
to deprive any one of the seaports affected by them of the pro­
portion of business that would naturally come to it under the 
operation of normal competition, the want of equity in the rates 
will appear, and it will be right to modify, or, perhaps, abolish 
them. 
Railroad problems assume such different phases from year to 
year, and almost from day to day, that those who have authority 
in railroad matters may justly be expected and required to give 
their earnest attention and best efforts to making their franchises 
accomplish the great ends of equal, fair, prompt and beneficial 
accommodation which was intended in their grant. And those 
ends they should have in view in determi ning upon the con­
tinued existence of differential rates. Their observation of the 
general course of traffic from day to day and from month to 
month ought to enable them to determine whether the differen­
tials are too large or too small ; whether they are influencing 
trade unfairly and unnaturally ;  and whether they operate as an 
improper restraint upon competition ; and when the improper 
effect is discovered, they ought to correct the wrong without 
hesitation or delay. To enable them to j udge fairly and with 
full understandi ng, accurate statistics of their business should 
be kept by each of them, and submitted to the others or kept in 
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some common office ; and these statistics ought to be periodically
given to the public also. Publicity is a great corrector of
imaginary evils, and may be an important preventive of evils,
both imaginary and real.
We do not assume or believe that there exists in railroad
official circles any legitimate authority to determine the ques-
tion of rates arbitrarily. Large powers of self government have,
undoubtedly, been left by the law in railroad managers, but all
their authority is qualified by duty to the public; and it cannot
be too often or too pointedly asserted that the obligation on
their part to serve the public with relative fairness is of perpet-
ual force. In their future dealings with the important question
which has been the occasion for our coming together, the great
Trunk Lines should be particularly careful to give no occasion
for just complaint, that they subject any one of the seaboard
cities to the operation of arbitrary or unfair regulations or
charges, or that they fail to observe towards any one of them,
or towards the people trading or desiring to trade with them,
the mandate of the common law—to deal justly and distribute


















































































































































some common office ; and these statistics ought to be periodically 
given to the public also. Publicity is a great corrector of 
imaginary evils, and may be an important preventive of evils, 
both imaginary and real. 
We do not assume or believe that there exists in railroad 
official circles any legitimate authority to determine the ques­
tion of rates arbitrarily. Large powers of self governmen t have, 
undoubtedly, been left by the Jaw in rail road managers, but all 
their authority is qualified by duty to the public ; and it can not 
be too often or too pointedly asserted that the obligation on 
their part to serve the public with relative fairness is of perpet­
ual force. In their future dealings with the important question 
which has been the occasion for our coming together, the great 
Trunk Lines should be particularly careful to give no occasion 
for j ust complaint, that they subject any one of the seaboard 
cities to the operation of arbitrary or unfair regulations or 
charges, or that they fail to observe towards any one of them , 
or towards the people trading or desiring to trade with them, 
the mandate of the common law-to deal j ustly and distribute 
fairly the benefits and burdens which are incident to their occu­
pation. 
NEW YORK, .Tidy 20, 1882. 
ALLEN G. THURMAN, 
E. B. W ASHBURNE, 
THOMAS M. COOLEY. 
